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 Although American and Canadian corporate law 
share many similarities, they are also marked by important 
institutional differences. Among the most notable are the 
differing roles of federal versus state/provincial policymak-
ing in the two countries: while American corporate law has 
been deeply influenced by jurisdictional competition among 
the states, Canadian law has instead been shaped by feder-
al legislative activity, as seen today in the standardizing in-
fluence of the Canada Business Corporations Act. These dif-
ferent institutional histories have led to distinct evolution-
ary paths, with important substantive consequences for 
contemporary corporate law. 
 Despite considerable academic attention to the sub-
ject of corporate law federalism, these historical differences 
between Canada and the United States are not well under-
stood. This article explains why jurisdictional competition 
arose in the United States but not Canada by examining 
the “Great Merger Movement” of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Specifically, this article makes 
three related arguments: (1) in the United States, the rise 
of jurisdictional competition was driven not by corporate 
governance issues, as is often assumed, but rather by the 
desire to avoid state and federal antitrust restrictions; (2) 
for a variety of reasons, cartelization and price fixing were 
more viable in Canada than the United States, delaying the 
onset of consolidative mergers; and (3) when the Canadian 
merger movement finally arrived, Canadian federal com-
pany law readily facilitated industrial consolidation, reduc-
ing the incentives for individual provinces to compete to at-
tract company charters. 
The different experiences of Canada and the United 
States reveal an intriguing historical irony—while Canadi-
an corporate law is sometimes criticized as lacking in com-
petitive responsiveness, the roots of this complacency are 
closely tied to the turn-of-the-century merger movement, in 
which Canadian law was less restrictive than its traditional 
American counterpart. 
 Malgré les nombreuses similitudes que partagent le 
droit des affaires américain et canadien, ils sont aussi mar-
qués par des différences institutionnelles importantes. On 
compte parmi les plus notables les rôles du fédéral par rap-
port à ceux des états ou des provinces dans l’élaboration des 
politiques des deux pays; tandis que le droit des affaires 
américain fut grandement influencé par une compétition 
juridictionnelle entre les états, le droit canadien a plutôt été 
façonné par l’activité législative fédérale, tel qu’on le voit 
aujourd’hui avec l’influence de standardisation de la Loi 
canadienne sur les sociétés par actions.   
 En dépit de l’attention considérable des académiciens 
sur le sujet du fédéralisme en droit des affaires, ces diffé-
rences historiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis ne sont 
pas très bien comprises. Cet article entend expliquer pour-
quoi une compétition juridictionnelle est survenue aux 
États-Unis et non au Canada, en analysant le « Grand 
mouvement des fusions » de la fin du dix-neuvième et du 
début du vingtième siècle. Plus particulièrement, cet article 
propose trois arguments : (1) aux États-Unis, la montée de 
la compétition juridictionnelle était motivée non pas par les 
problèmes de gouvernance des entreprises, tel qu’on le sup-
pose souvent, mais plutôt par le désir d’éviter les restric-
tions anti-trust étatiques et fédérales; (2) pour plusieurs 
raisons, la cartellisation et la fixation des prix étaient plus 
viables au Canada qu’aux États-Unis, entraînant un retard 
à l’émergence des fusions par consolidation; et (3) lorsque le 
mouvement canadien des fusions survint finalement, les 
lois sur les compagnies fédérales canadiennes ont grande-
ment facilité la consolidation industrielle, réduisant de ce 
fait les incitatifs pour les provinces à compétitionner seules 
pour attirer les compagnies à charte. 
 Les expériences différentes du Canada et des États-
Unis révèlent une intéressante ironie historique — alors 
que le droit des affaires canadien est parfois critiqué pour 
son manque de réactivité à la concurrence, les racines de 
cette complaisance sont étroitement reliées au tournant du 
siècle du mouvement des fusions, lors duquel le droit cana-
dien était moins restrictif que sa contrepartie américaine 
conventionnelle. 
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 A defining feature of American corporate law is its decentralized insti-
tutional structure. Alone among developed nations, the United States has 
never adopted a national corporation law, leaving the formation and gov-
ernance of business organizations to the laws of the individual states. 
This subnational system may seem quaint in an era of globalized econom-
ic activity, but it has given rise to one of the world’s most influential busi-
ness jurisdictions—the state of Delaware.1 Indeed, Delaware’s success is 
widely attributed to the nature of the US system itself, which has incen-
tivized states to tailor their laws in order to attract out-of-state firms.2 
Many scholars argue that state competition has undermined corporate 
governance standards,3 while others praise it as an important source of 
                                                  
1   Today, Delaware is the legal home to over one million business entities (many of which 
are based outside the United States), including over two-thirds of the Fortune 500. See 
Jeffrey W Bullock, “Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual Report” (2015) 
at 1, online: State of Delaware <corpfiles.delaware.gov> [perma.cc/ZP3J-VAMU]. 
2   Under the US constitutional system, corporations organized under the laws of a partic-
ular state are free to do business in any other state, regardless of geographic location. 
For practical purposes, this ability means corporations may freely select their preferred 
body of corporate law. See Jesse H Choper, John C Coffee, Jr, & Ronald J Gilson, Cases 
and Materials on Corporations, 8th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 
2013) at 229–34. Moreover, because states obtain economic benefits by attracting out-of-
state firms—including incorporation fees, franchise taxes, and business for corporate 
service providers—states have strong incentives to adapt their laws to the preferences 
of corporations themselves. As discussed in this article, Delaware has long been the 
most successful participant in this competition. For the classic analyses of state law 
competition, see generally William L Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware” (1974) 83:4 Yale LJ 663; Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation” (1977) 6:2 J Leg Stud 251 [Winter, 
“State Law, Shareholder Protection”]; Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corpo-
rate Law (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1993) [Romano, The 
Genius of American Corporate Law]. 
3   For a variety of critical perspectives on state law competition, see e.g. Oren Bar-Gill, 
Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, “The Market for Corporate Law” (2006) 162:1 J In-
stitutional & Theor Econ 134 at 137–41, 145–46; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Federalism 
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law” 
(1992) 105:7 Harv L Rev 1435 at 1440–45; Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Fer-
rell, “Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?” (2002) 90:6 Cal L 
Rev 1775 at 1806–20; Lucian A Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, “Federal Corporate Law: 
Lessons From History” (2006) 106:7 Colum L Rev 1793 at 1823–38; Cary, supra note 2; 
Ralph Nader, Mark Green & Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: 
WW Norton & Company, 1976) at 54–61; Donald E Schwartz, “Federalism and Corpo-
rate Governance” (1984) 45:3 Ohio St LJ 545 at 546–51; Joel Seligman, “A Brief History 
of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899” (1976) 1:2 Del J Corp L 249 at 283–87; 
Gordon G Young, “Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts” (1977) 
41:3 Law & Contemp Probs 146 at 150–51. 
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economically efficient legal rules.4 Regardless of perspective, nearly all 
agree that jurisdictional competition has profoundly shaped American 
law.5 
 Superficially, Canadian corporate law appears to share a similar de-
centralized character. In Canada, the provinces, territories, and federal 
government each have the power to form corporations, and—as in the 
United States—corporations are not required to be physically located in 
their “home” jurisdiction.6 Despite these structural similarities, signifi-
cant jurisdictional competition has never emerged in Canada. Indeed, Ca-
nadian corporate law has instead been characterized by increasing uni-
formity, particularly in recent decades.7 Rather than develop their own 
distinct legal rules, many provinces have followed the Canada Business 
                                                  
4   See e.g. Barry D Baysinger & Henry N Butler, “The Role of Corporate Law in the Theo-
ry of the Firm” (1985) 28:1 JL & Econ 179 at 184–91; Robert Daines, “Does Delaware 
Law Improve Firm Value?” (2001) 62:3 J Fin Econ 525; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel 
R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1991) at 212–27; Daniel R Fischel, “The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: 
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law” (1982) 76:6 Nw 
UL Rev 913; Roberta Romano, “Corporate Law as the Paradigm for Contractual Choice 
of Law” in FH Huckley, ed, The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999) 370 at 373–74; Roberta Romano, “Law as a Product: Some Piec-
es of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1:2 JL Econ & Org 225 [Romano, “Law as a Prod-
uct”]; Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 32–47; Ralph K 
Winter, Government and the Corporation (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research, 1978) at 28–42; Winter, “State Law, Shareholder Pro-
tection”, supra note 2. 
5   Although jurisdictional competition has been historically significant, it is doubtful 
whether any states seriously compete with Delaware today. See generally Marcel Ka-
han & Ehud Kamar, “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law” (2002) 55:3 
Stan L Rev 679. 
6   See Poonam Puri et al, Cases, Materials and Notes on Partnerships and Canadian 
Business Corporations, 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 68–69, 167–71. 
7   See Stanley M Beck et al, Cases and Materials on Partnerships and Canadian Business 
Corporations (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 152; Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIn-
tosh, “The Rationales Underlying Reincorporation and Implications for Canadian Cor-
porations” (2002) 22:3 Intl Rev L & Econ 277 at 280 [Cumming & MacIntosh, “Ration-
ales Underlying Reincorporation”]; Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “The 
Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law” (2000) 
20:2 Intl Rev L & Econ 141 at 159–60, 189 [Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional 
Competition”]; Jeff MacIntosh, “The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping 
Canadian Corporate Law: A Second Look” (1993) University of Toronto Law and Eco-
nomics Working Paper No 18 at 22–23 [MacIntosh, “Working Paper”]; Puri et al, supra 
note 6 at 170–71; Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 
at 118–28. Note, however, that competition can also result in uniformity (prices will be 
uniform in a perfectly competitive market, for example). 
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Corporations Act, a federal act passed in 1975 to modernize Canadian 
corporate law.8 
 In the United States, the costs and benefits of state competition have 
long been subject to academic debate. The question of whether state com-
petition leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency—often referred to as 
the “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate—is one of the clas-
sic research issues in American corporate legal scholarship.9 Despite the 
attention it has received in the United States, the possibility of similar 
competition in Canada remains underexplored. For a time, the only pub-
lished research on the subject was by Ronald Daniels, then at the Univer-
sity of Toronto. Writing in the early 1990s, Daniels questioned the bene-
fits of standardization, a goal he saw as unduly emphasized by the Cana-
dian corporate legal community.10 In his article “Should Provinces Com-
pete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market,” Daniels argued 
in favour of jurisdictional competition in the model of the United States. 
Despite his enthusiasm, however, Daniels acknowledged institutional ob-
stacles to greater provincial competition in Canada. According to Daniels, 
these obstacles included (1) the broad and overlapping jurisdiction of the 
provincial securities regulators and (2) the centralized appellate authority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, both of which served to limit the devel-
opment of distinctive provincial corporate law.11 
 In response to Daniels, Jeffrey MacIntosh and Douglas Cumming have 
expressed skepticism as to the viability of Canadian jurisdictional compe-
tition.12 Unlike Daniels, who sees provincial conformity around the CBCA 
as the product of competitive pressures, MacIntosh and Cumming find lit-
tle evidence that provinces compete for corporations. Employing a variety 
of statistical measures, the authors conclude that provincial legislatures 
have pursued a strategy of uniformity, not competition, and that a num-
ber of institutional barriers have discouraged provincial legal innova-
                                                  
8   RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. The current corporation acts of Alberta, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Sas-
katchewan are based on the CBCA. British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Quebec each 
have their own distinctive acts, though these have also been influenced by the CBCA. 
9   See supra note 3 and note 4 and accompanying text. 
10   See generally Ronald J Daniels, “Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competi-
tive Corporate Law Market” (1991) 36:1 McGill LJ 130. 
11   See ibid at 182–84, 186–88. Daniels also addressed (and dismissed) a number of other 
possible obstacles, including the inability of the provinces to realize minimum efficient 
scale, professional conservatism on the part of Canadian legal practitioners, and the ge-
ographic concentration of businesses in central/eastern Canada (ibid at 180–188). 
12   See MacIntosh, “Working Paper”, supra note 7; Cumming & MacIntosh, “Rationales 
Underlying Reincorporation”, supra note 7 at 288–97; Cumming & MacIntosh, “Inter-
jurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7. 
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tion.13 Like Daniels, MacIntosh and Cumming cite provincial securities 
regulation and the centralized appellate authority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada as factors undermining provincial competition.14 But they also 
point to broader obstacles, including the relatively sparse body of Canadi-
an corporate legal precedent (which encourages provincial courts to rely 
on cases from other provinces),15 protectionist regulations of provincial 
law societies (which have discouraged Canadian lawyers from recom-
mending out-of-province incorporation),16 and a general lack of “competi-
tive consciousness” among the Canadian legal and policy communities.17 
Writing from the American perspective, Roberta Romano has cited many 
of these same factors as discouraging jurisdictional competition in Cana-
da.18 Finally, Christopher Nicholls offers a simpler explanation—given the 
smaller size of the Canadian economy, there may not be enough revenue 
at stake to incentivize provinces to actively compete.19 Ultimately, alt-
hough perspectives on the issue vary, the existing literature broadly sug-
gests that competition among the provinces has been limited by institu-
tional factors distinctive to Canadian federalism. 
 Without disputing these factors, this article takes a different approach 
to the question of Canadian legal competition. Rather than analyzing the 
current institutional environment, this article provides a historical expla-
nation of how that environment came to exist. More specifically, this arti-
cle argues that divergent patterns of jurisdictional competition in Canada 
and the United States can be traced to the corporate merger movements 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.20 During this period, 
                                                  
13   See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7. 
14   See ibid at 154–56. 
15   See ibid at 155. 
16   See ibid at 169–71. 
17   Ibid at 151. 
18   See Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 118–28. 
19   See Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) at 35. 
But see Daniels, supra note 10 (who anticipates this argument in his original article 
at 180).  
20   In the American historiography, this movement is referred to as the “Great Merger 
Movement.” See e.g. Naomi R Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American 
Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Although 
historians invariably describe this movement in terms of “mergers”, relatively few 
transactions of the period were mergers (or amalgamations) in the legal sense. Under 
most corporation acts, mergers were restricted to domestic corporations incorporated in 
the same jurisdiction, limiting the usefulness of statutory mergers as a means of creat-
ing national firms. As discussed in this article, most national firms during the Great 
Merger Movement were created by stock or asset purchases. To minimize confusion and 
to remain consistent with the existing literature, this article adopts the historical con-
vention of using the term “merger” to refer to any consolidation of two or more busi-
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both Canada and the United States experienced unprecedented industrial 
consolidation, as thousands of formerly independent firms disappeared in-
to “trusts” or “combines”.21 Although the merger movements in the two 
countries shared many similarities, they occurred within very different 
legal contexts. In the United States, prohibitions on consolidation at both 
the state and federal levels channeled businesses toward jurisdictions of-
fering an “escape” from corporate merger restrictions. By the time of the 
Canadian merger movement, neither the federal government nor the in-
dividual provinces imposed meaningful limits on consolidation, and com-
panies were generally free to merge and expand as they saw fit. Signifi-
cantly, Canadian federal company legislation was relatively liberal,22 such 
that a majority of the largest Canadian businesses chose to incorporate 
under federal law.23 Thus, while legal conditions in the United States led 
to a “race” to dismantle corporate restrictions, there was less opportunity 
for Canadian provinces to offer similar advantages. In effect, the permis-
siveness of federal law precluded provincial competition. 
 Given current perceptions of Canadian corporate law, this history pre-
sents an intriguing irony: today, Canadian law is sometimes criticized as 
insufficiently attentive to business needs, and a number of scholars have 
suggested the benefits of a more competitive, US-style system.24 Though 
      
nesses, no matter how consummated. Similarly, this article refers to the combined firms 
resulting from mergers as “combinations”. 
21   Ibid. See generally Gregory P Marchildon, Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the 
Gilded Age of Canadian Finance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 245–59 
[Marchildon, Profits and Politics]. The popular term for these combinations in the Unit-
ed States was “trusts,” whereas in Canada they were referred to as “combines.” Neither 
were technical terms, but were used generically to refer to large corporations (ibid). As 
discussed in this article, the timing of the merger movements in the two countries was 
somewhat different, with the first Canadian merger wave lagging the United States’ by 
about a decade (ibid at 258). Similar merger movements also occurred in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, though on a smaller scale than in North America (ibid at 247–
48). 
22   For purposes of this article, the word “liberal” means legally permissive. Thus, Canadi-
an law was “liberal” in that it placed few constraints on business activities. 
23   See Part II B below. The Parliament of Canada adopted successive companies acts 
(providing for federal incorporation of joint stock companies) in 1869, 1877, 1902, and 
1934. The current CBCA is a descendant of these earlier acts. 
24   See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7 at 142; 
Daniels, supra note 10; Ronald J Daniels & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “Toward a Distinctive 
Canadian Corporate Law Regime” (1991) 29:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 863 at 898–99; Sté-
phane Rousseau, “The Evolution of Corporate Law in Canada: Towards Regulatory 
Competition?” (2016) at 3, 10–13, online (pdf): SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2752131>. Many scholars have questioned recent corporate law deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Given the Court’s authority over the Canadian 
judicial system, these criticisms raise questions regarding Canada’s centralized corpo-
rate law jurisprudence. See e.g. Sarah P Bradley, “BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: 
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not directly related, these criticisms run parallel to more general concep-
tions of Canadian law, particularly its greater solicitude for corporate so-
cial responsibility. These conceptions—that Canadian jurisprudence has 
rejected the shareholder primacy norm, that directors’ duties are funda-
mentally tied to notions of the “good corporate citizen,” and that Canadian 
courts are increasingly responsive to environmental, social, and communi-
ty interests25—distinguish Canadian law, in the eyes of many scholars, 
from the more narrow focus on economic profits that has traditionally 
characterized American law.26 Recent amendments to the CBCA have on-
ly strengthened this impression.27 But while Canadian corporate law may 
be moving toward a broader conception of social responsibility, its focus 
during the early twentieth century could hardly have been more different. 
      
The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance and Good Corpo-
rate Citizenship?” (2009–2010) 41:2 Ottawa L Rev 325; Edward Iacobucci, “Indetermi-
nacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties” 
(2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 232; Mohamed F Khimji, “Peoples v. Wise – Conflating Direc-
tors’ Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholder Protection” (2005) 39:1 UBC L Rev 209; Jef-
frey G MacIntosh, “BCE and the Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quick-
sand” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 255; J Anthony VanDuzer, “BCE v. 1976 Debenturehold-
ers: The Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Deci-
sion Since Peoples” (2010) 43:1 UBC L Rev 205; Jacob S Ziegel, “The Peoples Judgment 
and the Supreme Court’s Role in Private Law Cases” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 236. 
25   For a discussion of the status of non-shareholder “stakeholder” constituencies under 
Canadian law, see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory of Canadian Cor-
porate Law” (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 299 at 300–02; Jeffrey Bone, “Corporate Environ-
mental Responsibility in the Wake of the Supreme Court Decision of BCE Inc. and Bell 
Canada” (2009) 27 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 5 at 7; Carol Liao, “The Next Stage of 
CSR for Canada: Transformational Corporate Governance, Hybrid Legal Structures, 
and the Growth of Social Enterprise” (2013) 9:1 JSDLP 53 at 69–73; Carol Liao, “A Crit-
ical Canadian Perspective on the Benefit Corporation” (2017) 40:2 Seattle UL Rev 683 
at 700–03; PM Vasudev, “Corporate Stakeholders in Canada—An Overview and a Pro-
posal” (2013–2014) 45:1 Ottawa L Rev 137 at 165–71. As these authors emphasize, the 
power of corporate directors to consider broader stakeholder interests has significantly 
expanded in the wake of Peoples Department Stores v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples De-
partment Stores] and BCE v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 [BCE]. 
26   Even under Delaware law, the status of shareholder primacy as an enforceable legal 
norm is unclear. Shareholder primacy has nearly overwhelming influence as a practical 
and normative matter, however. For discussion of the legal force of the shareholder 
primacy norm, see generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of His-
tory for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 439; Robert J Rhee, “A Legal Theory of 
Shareholder Primacy” (2018) 102:5 Minn L Rev 1951; Leo E Strine, Jr, “Our Continuing 
Struggle with The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit” (2012) 47:1 Wake 
Forest L Rev 135. See also Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc v Newmark, 16 A 3d 1 at 34–35 
(Del Ch 2010). For a forceful academic challenge to this norm, see Margaret M Blair & 
Lynn A Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85:2 Va L Rev 247. 
27   Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No 1, SC 2019, c 29, ss 141–44.  See also An Act to 
Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the Cana-
da Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, and the Competition Act, SC 2018, c 25. 
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At the time of the Canadian merger movement, Canadian law was pri-
marily focused on the interests of the business class, eschewing the re-
strictive antitrust28 provisions that were common in the United States. 
Ironically, it was the restrictive nature of American law—and the result-
ing economic and political pressures—that eventually led to the United 
States’ distinctive pattern of jurisdictional competition. As similar re-
strictions on corporations were largely absent from Canadian law, pres-
sures to eliminate them never organically emerged.  
 Following this introduction, the remainder of this article proceeds as 
follows. Part II describes how merger restrictions led to competition 
among the states. In the context of the industrial consolidation of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—during which many states’ 
corporate laws prevented or discouraged mergers—the state of New Jer-
sey attracted corporations by facilitating national combinations. New Jer-
sey’s success in drawing corporations (and the associated tax revenues) 
led to a decades-long period of state competition, in which Delaware was 
the eventual winner. Part III examines the Canadian experience, in which 
jurisdictional competition was relatively muted. In Canada, the absence of 
meaningful antitrust restrictions and the permissiveness of federal com-
pany law reduced both demand-side pressure (from the business commu-
nity) and supply-side pressure (from provincial governments) for major 
corporate law reform. Part IV concludes, assessing (1) how historical dif-
ferences between Canada and the United States have influenced the sub-
stance of corporate law and (2) whether circumstances exist for increasing 
competition in Canada today. 
I. State Corporate Chartermongering29 and the Rise of Delaware 
 American corporate law is often identified with the law of Delaware, 
the country’s leading jurisdiction for business organizations. Through its 
dominance of the incorporation market for the largest American firms, 
Delaware exerts an outsized influence on the American corporate legal 
landscape.30 In the academic literature, Delaware’s prominence is often 
attributed to its accommodating corporate governance standards, which 
                                                  
28   In this article, the term “antitrust” refers not only to federal competition legislation, but 
also state corporate law restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. Both federal antitrust 
legislation and state corporate law restrictions were products of the same populist 
movement of the late nineteenth century. 
29   For a definition of “chartermongering”, see Christopher Grandy, “New Jersey Corporate 
Chartermongering, 1875–1929” (1989) 49:3 J Econ Hist 677 (“the active solicitation of 
corporation Charters for the purpose of bolstering state revenues” at 677). 
30   See Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 6–12. 
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appeal to the managers who control incorporation decisions.31 Although 
corporate governance is an important factor in Delaware’s success, the or-
igins of the state’s rise to prominence are actually grounded in antitrust 
policy. As this Part explains, it was legal restrictions on industrial consol-
idation at both the state and federal levels that incited the race toward 
permissive corporation laws. Given the focus of corporate legal scholar-
ship on the relationship between management and shareholders, and its 
conception of jurisdictional competition almost exclusively in terms there-
of, recovering the role of antitrust policy in state competition is an im-
portant corrective. Moreover, this history provides a revealing contrast to 
the Canadian consolidation experience, in which meaningful restrictions 
on mergers and combinations were largely absent. 
A. Mounting Industrial Consolidation 
 During the late nineteenth century, technological, economic, and de-
mographic developments led to a major increase in American industrial 
consolidation.32 By the late 1880s, improvements in transportation, com-
munication, and manufacturing technologies significantly increased re-
turns to scale across a range of emerging industries.33 Combined with rap-
id population growth, this “second industrial revolution” led to profound 
economic change—creating new markets, increasing productivity, and 
giving rise to ever larger firms.34 In the 1890s, these changes culminated 
in a sudden, sweeping wave of industrial mergers. During the ten-year 
period of 1895–1904, more than 1,800 independent firms disappeared into 
business combinations.35 Many of the firms resulting from these mer-
gers—commonly referred to as “trusts”—obtained dominant positions 
within their respective industries.36 
 Several factors contributed to this “Great Merger Movement,” the 
most extensive period of business consolidation in American history. The 
leading explanation is that of economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux, 
whose monograph The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 
                                                  
31   See e.g. Cary, supra note 2 at 669; Winter, supra note 2 at 25255. Whereas Cary criti-
cizes Delaware’s “race for the bottom” (at 705), Winter argues that states cannot “rig” 
their corporate law because the ensuing capital flight and threat of takeovers would de-
ter managers from choosing inefficient jurisdictions (at 254, 289). 
32   See generally Alfred D Chandler, Jr, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capi-
talism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 47–233 [Chandler, Scale 
and Scope]. 
33   See ibid. 
34   See ibid. 
35   See Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 2. 
36   See ibid at 1–5; Chandler, supra note 32 at 315–44. 
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1895–1904 provides a theoretical and empirical account of why and how 
the movement occurred.37 According to Lamoreaux, while the movement 
reflected fundamental changes in the structure of the American economy, 
it was triggered by a “particular conjunction” of specific historical circum-
stances: (1) the rapid expansion of capital-intensive (and thus high-fixed-
cost) industries in the early 1890s, (2) the financial panic of 1893, which 
caused a sudden reduction in aggregate demand and a subsequent in-
crease in price competition, and (3) efforts to combat falling prices 
through anti-competitive business combinations.38 This conjunction of 
high fixed costs and depressed economic conditions in the 1890s created 
an environment of “ruinous” price competition (i.e., pricing below average 
cost) that businessmen were desperate to alleviate.39 However, given the 
size, diversity, and competitiveness of the American economy, cartel and 
other price-fixing arrangements proved difficult to enforce.40 To make 
matters worse, price fixing was declared illegal by the Sherman Act of 
1890.41 Given these practical and legal constraints on agreements among 
independent firms, mergers became the favoured means of reducing com-
petition.42  
 Although Lamoreaux’s account is foundational, other scholars have of-
fered additional explanations for the Great Merger Movement. Business 
historians such as Alfred Chandler have explained the merger movement 
primarily in terms of the efficiency of large-scale management processes.43 
                                                  
37   See Lamoreaux, supra note 20. 
38   Ibid at 12. 
39   Mary A O’Sullivan, Dividends of Development: Securities Markets in the History of US 
Capitalism, 1866-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 155–61. 
40   On the intensity of competition and the failure of anticompetitive devices, see e.g. Ga-
briel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 
1900-1916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967) at 27–28. The inherent weakness of car-
tel arrangements was compounded by the fact that they were unenforceable at common 
law. John D Rockefeller, who consolidated the Standard Oil empire, famously referred 
to cartel agreements as “ropes of sand” (see Brian R Cheffins, “Mergers and Corporate 
Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at the Turn of the 20th Centu-
ry” (2003) 51:3 Am J Comp L 473 at 483). 
41   See Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 162–69. The Sherman Act was enacted as An Act to 
Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, c 647, 26 
Stat 209 (1890) [Sherman Act]. 
42   The economic pressures that often-undermined price-fixing efforts are described in 
Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 46–117. The legal advantages of mergers over traditional 
anticompetitive devices are described in Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American 
Law, 1836–1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 244–67. 
43   See generally Chandler, Scale and Scope, supra note 32; Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The 
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1977) [Chandler, The Visible Hand]. 
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According to Chandler, the development of modern business management 
was critical to the success of integrated firms, as it facilitated the harness-
ing of new technologies and the resultant economies in production and 
distribution.44 Another explanation for the Great Merger Movement is the 
development of a national equity market, which first emerged for “indus-
trial” corporations (i.e., manufacturers) in the 1890s.45 As financial mar-
kets recovered from the panic of 1893, increasing demand for industrial 
securities encouraged “promoters”46 to organize large business combina-
tions financed by public shares.47 Due to the monopoly profits available 
from merging competing firms (as per Lamoreaux), the greater economic 
efficiency of large, integrated businesses (as per Chandler), or simply the 
market speculation of the late 1890s and early 1900s, stock offerings by 
industrial combinations sold readily and at high premiums.48 Finally, fed-
eral tariff policy—which impeded foreign price competition—also encour-
aged the merger movement by protecting domestic monopolies.49 Ulti-
                                                  
44   See Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 43. 
45   See Jonathan Barron Baskin & Paul J Miranti, Jr, A History of Corporate Finance 
(Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 196–98. Prior to the 1890s, 
private issues on American securities markets were dominated by railroad bonds (see 
Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 43 at 91–93, 331–32). 
46   “Promoter” being the historical term for a financier who orchestrated mergers. 
47   See generally Thomas R Navin & Marian V Sears, “The Rise of a Market for Industrial 
Securities, 1887–1902” (1955) 29:2 Bus Hist Rev 105 at 127–31; Ralph L Nelson, Merger 
Movements in American Industry, 1895–1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959) at 90–91; see generally Gene Smiley, “The Expansion of the New York Securities 
Market at the Turn of the Century” (1981) 55:1 Bus Hist Rev 75 at 79. 
48   See George J Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger” (Paper delivered at the Six-
ty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 27–30 December 
1949), (1950) 40:2 Am Econ Rev 23; Jesse W Markham, “Survey of the Evidence and 
Findings on Mergers” in Business Concentration and Price Policy: A Conference of the 
Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press in association with the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955) 
141 at 162 (however, Markham asserts that “many early mergers... obtained no signifi-
cant degree of market control” at 158); Nelson, supra note 47 at 91; Baskin & Miranti, 
supra note 45 at 194. 
49   The consequences of tariff policy for trusts were widely recognized at the time. No less 
than Henry Havemeyer, president of the notorious “Sugar Trust,” believed that “[t]he 
mother of all trusts is the customs tariff bill” (US, Industrial Commission, 56th Cong, 
Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations, Together with Testimony, 
Review of Evidence, Charts Showing Effects on Prices, and Topical Digest (Doc No 476) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900) at 101 (Henry O Havemeyer) 
[Testimony Before the Industrial Commission]. See also Byron W Holt, “The Relation of 
the Protective Tariff to the Trusts” (Paper delivered at the Nineteenth Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association, 26–28 December 1906) (1907) 8 Publications of 
the American Economic Association 212 at 217; Byron W Holt, “The Tariff the Mother 
of Trusts” (Paper delivered at the Chicago Conference on Trusts, 14 September 1899) 
[unpublished] at 1. 
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mately, each of these various factors played a role, providing firms with a 
number of reasons to merge with their competitors.  
 Consolidation was hindered, however, by state and federal antitrust 
law. At the federal level, the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited a range of 
anticompetitive activity. Section 1 of the act barred “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States.”50 Section 2 spoke to mo-
nopoly directly, declaring “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, ... any part of the trade or commerce” to be guilty of 
a misdemeanor.51 Despite this broad language, however, the act’s practi-
cal significance was limited. Private and government enforcement was 
minimal, meaning few cases were brought to clarify the act’s provisions.52 
Due to weak enforcement by the federal government and the inherent 
ambiguity of the act’s language, voluntary compliance on the part of busi-
nesses was indifferent, at best.53 In the years following the act’s adoption, 
many firms continued to engage in anticompetitive business practices.54 
 Moreover, under the historical conception of the division of power be-
tween the federal government and the states, federal prosecutors had 
greater scope to attack price fixing among independent firms (which 
Lamoreaux refers to as “loose” combinations) than monopolies organized 
as single, integrated corporations (which Lamoreaux refers to as “tight” 
combinations).55 According to the constitutional understanding of the 
time, the regulation of corporations—no matter how large or powerful—
was properly reserved to the state governments responsible for their crea-
tion.56 This conception of the states’ role in regulating corporations was 
strengthened by the US Supreme Court’s early Sherman Act decisions. In 
a series of cases in the 1890s, the US Supreme Court interpreted the 
                                                  
50   Sherman Act, supra note 41 at § 1.  
51   Ibid at § 2.  
52   See Hans B Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradi-
tion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955) at 369–70. The Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice—the office responsible for antitrust enforcement—was not cre-
ated until 1903 (see ibid at 534–37). 
53   See Brian Cheffins, “The Development of Competition Policy, 1890–1940: A Re-
evaluation of a Canadian and American Tradition” (1989) 27:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 449 
at 457 [Cheffins, “Development of Competition Policy”]. 
54   See Thorelli, supra note 52 at 308. 
55   Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 164. 
56   See Charles W McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of 
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903” (1979) 53:3 Bus Hist Rev 304 at 305–06. 
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Sherman Act to prohibit “restraints of trade,”57 but to allow the formation 
of monopolies by directly acquiring competitors.58 This legal result—in 
which price fixing was illegal but mergers to monopoly were not—
incentivized mergers as a means of reducing competition.59 Ironically, the 
practical effect of the Sherman Act was to encourage combinations, which 
significantly increased in size and number in the decade following its en-
actment.60 
 Federal law was not the only obstacle to consolidation, however. Dur-
ing the late nineteenth century, state corporation acts placed major limits 
on the size and structure of corporations.61 These acts, reflecting the his-
torical legacy of Jacksonian democracy and an enduring suspicion of con-
centrated power, imposed substantial limits on corporate capitalization, 
duration of corporate existence, and the scope of corporations’ business ac-
tivities.62 By the late 1880s, public concern over the emergence of trusts 
had become a major political issue, and state lawmakers and Attorneys 
General became increasingly aggressive in attacking combinations.63 
These attacks came in two forms—legislative and prosecutorial. On the 
legislative front, a common approach was to add antitrust provisions di-
                                                  
57   See United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 US 290 (1897); United States v 
Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 US 505 (1898); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co v United States, 175 
US 211 (1899), each holding price fixing to be illegal. Note that such “restraints of 
trade” were already unenforceable at common law, see William Letwin, Law and Eco-
nomic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1965) at 39–52. 
58   See United States v E C Knight Co, 156 US 1 (1895), in which the Supreme Court held 
that a series of transactions resulting in control of 98% of American sugar manufactur-
ing did not violate the Sherman Act. Although the court’s decision was predicated on a 
(since-abandoned) constitutional distinction between manufacturing and “interstate 
commerce,” and not the structure of the transactions itself, the decision was widely in-
terpreted as validating mergers to monopoly. 
59   See Alfred S Eichner, The Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refining as a Case Study 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969) at 14–17; Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 162–69; 
cf George Bittlingmayer, “Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?” (1985) 
28:1 JL & Econ 77 (for a view not solely based on monopoly gain). For a more tempered 
view of the role of antitrust law in the Great Merger Movement, see Cheffins, “Devel-
opment of Competition Policy”, supra note 53 at 451–60.  
60   See Thorelli, supra note 52 at 306. See also Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 32 
at 288–94; John C Coffee, Jr, “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and 
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control” (2001) 111:1 Yale LJ 1 at 33; 
Morton J Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory” 
(1985) 88:2 W Va L Rev 173 at 199. 
61   See Hovenkamp, supra note 42 at 243–49. 
62   See Seligman, supra note 3 at 256–64. 
63   See Charles M Yablon, “The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and 
the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910” (2007) 32:2 J Corp L 323 at 338. 
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rectly to corporate or criminal statutes, a measure taken by twenty seven 
states as of 1890.64 Many of these provisions forbade corporations from 
purchasing or holding other corporations’ stock, thereby preventing the 
“holding company” structure as a means of effecting corporate mergers.65 
With respect to litigation, several states brought successful actions 
against large combinations, claiming they had exceeded their powers un-
der the state’s corporate franchise.66 These cases were generally predicat-
ed on one of two legal doctrines: (1) the common law principle of ultra vir-
es or (2) statutory grants to state Attorneys General of the power to bring 
quo warranto proceedings.67 In light of these corporate law devices—and 
notwithstanding the weakness of the Sherman Act—state law served as a 
major impediment to large-scale industrial mergers. 
 Specific examples illustrate these laws’ general character. New York 
and Illinois—along with twenty-five other states—expressly prohibited 
combinations for the purpose of reducing competition.68 New York’s Stock 
Corporation Law barred mergers “for the creation of a monopoly or the 
unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of competition in any 
necessary of life,”69 while Illinois’ Trusts and Conspiracies Against Trade 
act provided that any corporation guilty of fixing prices, restricting out-
put, or otherwise reducing competition “shall thereby forfeit its charter 
and franchise, and its corporate existence shall cease.”70 Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts limited corporate size and capital structure, another com-
mon approach. In both states, industrial corporations were prohibited 
from having more than one million dollars’ capital stock, along with other 
                                                  
64   See Seligman, supra note 3 at 263. In addition, fifteen states added antitrust provisions 
directly in their constitutions (ibid). 
65   See Melvin I Urofsky, “Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era” (1982) 
26:2 Am J Leg Hist 160 at 162–63. 
66   Cases against major combinations were brought by California, Illinois, Louisiana, Ne-
braska, New York, and Ohio: see Yablon, supra note 63 at 338, n 64; People ex rel Pea-
body v Chicago Gas Trust Co, 130 Ill 268 (Ill Sup Ct 1889) [Chicago Gas Trust]. See also 
Seligman, supra note 3 at 264. 
67   The common law doctrine of ultra vires (meaning “beyond the powers”) held that corpo-
rations could not take action outside the scope of their specific legal authority. Similar-
ly, quo warranto proceedings (meaning “by what warrant?”) were a legal means of pre-
venting corporations from acting contrary to state law. 
68   See Seligman, supra note 3 at 263. 
69   Charles A Collin, The Revised Statutes of the State of New York (Albany: Banks & 
Brothers, 1896) vol 2 at 1003, 1008. 
70   Harvey B Hurd, The Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois (Chicago: Chicago Legal 
News Company, 1893) at 516–18, 519. 
124   (2018) 64:1   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
  
restrictions.71 Finally, quo warranto laws were a powerful means of at-
tacking monopolistic trusts, as demonstrated by the dramatic prosecution 
of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (discussed below). Armed with stat-
utory proscriptions, quo warranto powers, and the common law doctrine 
of ultra vires, states were equipped with a variety of tools for combatting 
corporate consolidation.72 
 Many states used these tools aggressively. Each of the states listed in 
Annex A pursued major legal actions against the large combinations that 
began to emerge in the late 1880s and early 1890s. To give but a few 
prominent examples, the Attorney General of Illinois brought a successful 
quo warranto proceeding against the Chicago Gas Trust Company in the 
late 1880s, challenging the company’s strategy of buying out its major 
competitors.73 Deciding the matter on appeal in 1889, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held, as a matter of Illinois law, that corporations were not permit-
ted to acquire the stock of other corporations, particularly if their motive 
was to reduce competition.74 A year later, the New York Court of Appeals 
approved a similar quo warranto action against a constituent corporation 
of the infamous Havemeyer “Sugar Trust.”75 After holding that the corpo-
ration had exceeded its legal authority by joining a horizontal combina-
tion, the Court invoked the “extreme rigor of the law,” sentencing the de-
fendant to “corporate death.”76 As a final example, the famous attempt by 
the Attorney General of Ohio to destroy the Standard Oil Trust provides 
evidence of both the strengths and weaknesses of state corporate law as a 
means of imposing antitrust restrictions.77 Although the Ohio Supreme 
Court ruled in favour of Standard Oil Company on statute of limitations 
grounds, it also prohibited the corporation from continuing to participate 
                                                  
71   See John Purdon, A Digest of the Statute Law of the State of Pennsylvania from the Year 
1700 to 1894 (Philadelphia: Kay and Brother, 1894) vol 1 at 404, 417; The Public Stat-
utes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Boston: Rand, Avery & Company, 1882) 
at 573, 577. Limiting capitalization to $1 million (approximately $30,100,000 in 2017 
dollars) was a significant restriction. To put this amount in perspective, the United 
States Steel Corporation, one of the largest combinations of the era, was incorporated in 
New Jersey with a capitalization of $1.4 billion. For more detailed information on these 
provisions, see Annex A. 
72   Annex A summarizes key antitrust provisions and other restrictions on corporations 
enacted by the five most prosperous states as of 1895. 
73   See Chicago Gas Trust, supra note 66. 
74   See ibid at 303. 
75   People v North River Sugar Refining Co, 24 NE 834 at 841 (NY 1890); aff’g 7 NYS 406 
(NY Gen Term 1889); aff’g 3 NYS 401 (NY Cir Ct 1889). 
76   Ibid at 834. 
77   See State ex rel Attorney General v Standard Oil Co, 30 NE 279 (Ohio Sup Ct 1892). 
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in the larger trust.78 This prohibition proved ineffective—following the 
ruling, Standard Oil abandoned its trust structure and reorganized as a 
New Jersey corporation.79 Standard Oil was not alone in its decision to re-
incorporate.80 By the 1890s, New Jersey had emerged as a protective ha-
ven from the “extreme rigor” of its sister states. 
B. New Jersey Chartermongering 
 As American industry consolidated, New Jersey took advantage of the 
obstacles imposed by other states. Even before the 1890s, New Jersey was 
a welcoming home to corporations—its 1875 corporation act was relatively 
permissive for its time81 and its conservative judiciary was well regarded 
by the Wall Street bar.82 Capitalizing on its reputation, New Jersey em-
barked on a series of reforms that made it more attractive to out-of-state 
firms.83 New Jersey’s liberal policy toward corporations—motivated by a 
desire to attract corporate tax and franchise revenues—precipitated the 
race in corporate law reform, as legislators in other states sought to repli-
cate New Jersey’s strategy.84 
 The ability of New Jersey to draw businesses from other states was a 
result of the peculiar status of corporations under American federalism. 
Since the US government had never enacted a federal corporation act, 
corporations could only be formed under the laws of individual states.85 In 
                                                  
78   See ibid at 291. Standard Oil Company, the named defendant, was one of the constitu-
ent corporations controlled by the Standard Oil Trust. 
79   See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1991) at 97–98; Testimony Before the Industrial Commission, supra 
note 49 at 574–76 (John D Archbold); John Moody, The Truth About the Trusts: A De-
scription and Analysis of the American Trust Movement (New York: Moody Publishing 
Company, 1904) at 109–26. 
80   See supra notes 96−99 and accompanying text. See also McCurdy, supra note 56 
at 321–23. 
81   See The General Law of the State of New Jersey Concerning Corporations (Trenton: 
Naar, Day & Naar, 1889); Edward Quinton Keasbey, “New Jersey and Trusts” in Chi-
cago Conference on Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Resolutions, Lists of the Delegates, Com-
mittees, Etc (Chicago: Lakeside Press in association with the Civic Federation of Chica-
go, 1900) 383 at 385, 389.  
82   See Keasbey, supra note 81 at 385, 389; Lincoln Steffens, “New Jersey: A Traitor State” 
(1905) 24:6 McClure’s Magazine 649 at 658. 
83   See Yablon, supra note 63 at 331–45. 
84   See generally Grandy, supra note 29; Urofsky, supra note 65 at 163–64; Yablon, supra 
note 63. 
85   Although Congress created a small number of corporations through specific legislation 
(the transcontinental railroads, for example), general incorporation remained the exclu-
sive domain of the states. For the history of political efforts to pass a federal corporation 
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addition, the Commerce Clause86 limited states’ power to discriminate 
against “foreign” (out-of-state) corporations, preventing state governments 
from excluding corporations organized in other states.87 Finally, under the 
“internal affairs” doctrine, a corporation’s internal governance was regu-
lated by its state of incorporation, not the laws of other states in which it 
did business.88 Together, these principles allowed corporations to avoid 
unfavourable legal rules through jurisdictional selection. Having dis-
pensed with any legal requirement that shareholders or directors be state 
residents, and having explicitly empowered corporations to do business in 
other states, New Jersey emerged as a favoured destination for large in-
dustrial combinations.89 
 Beginning in the late 1880s, New Jersey revised its corporation act 
specifically to attract out-of-state capital. In response to lobbying efforts 
by James B. Dill, a talented and ambitious Wall Street attorney, New Jer-
sey enacted a number of reforms presumably for the purpose of attracting 
New York promoters.90 Among these reforms, the most significant was an 
1889 amendment allowing corporations to freely purchase the stock 
and/or assets of out-of-state firms.91 Attracted by these reforms, industri-
      
act, see generally Camden Hutchison, “Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation 
and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement” (2017) 2017:3 Colum Bus L Rev 
1017 [Hutchison, “Progressive Era Conceptions”]. 
86   See US Const, art I § 8 cl 3. 
87   Note that as a matter of constitutional law, these limits remained uncertain until the 
twentieth century (see Horwitz, supra note 60 at 188–90). Even before these limits were 
clarified, states faced practical and economic obstacles to excluding out-of-state corpora-
tions (see Hovenkamp, supra note 42 at 258–63). 
88   For a historical analysis of the complex relationship between the Commerce Clause and 
the internal affairs doctrine, see generally Frederick Tung, “Before Competition: Ori-
gins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine” (2006) 32:1 J Corp L 33. 
89   New Jersey expressly empowered corporations to do business outside the state in the 
corporation act of 1875. This power was broadened by An Act Concerning Corporations, 
NJ Laws, c 185 (1896) [Act Concerning Corporations]. Neither the 1875 act nor the 1896 
act placed any residency requirements on shareholders or directors. 
90   See Urofsky, supra note 65 at 163. Significantly, the content of these reforms was large-
ly inspired by Dill’s admiration for English company law and his concomitant view that 
American law was overly restrictive. See discussion in Testimony Before the Industrial 
Commission, supra note 49 at 1082–83 (James B Dill). For discussion of Dill’s central 
role in New Jersey legal reform, see generally Elizabeth Ann Schiller, James Brooks 
Dill: Father of the Trusts (MA Thesis, Seton Hall University, 2009) [unpublished]. 
91   See An Act Concerning Corporations, NJ Laws, c 265 at § 4 (1889). By its terms, this 
provision applied only to the purchase of stock of “any company or companies owning, 
mining, manufacturing or producing materials, or other property, necessary for [the 
business of the purchaser]” (ibid). A comprehensive provision applicable to any and all 
stock acquisitions was passed in 1893 (see An Act Concerning Corporations, NJ Laws, 
c 171 (1893)).  
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alists and promoters fearing legal attack in their home states began to in-
corporate in New Jersey.92 In 1896, the entirety of the New Jersey corpo-
ration act was comprehensively rewritten by a revision commission 
chaired by Dill.93 This 1896 act is widely credited by US scholars as the 
first modern, “enabling” corporation act.94 Its logical organization and 
minimal legal requirements were a far cry from other state corporation 
statutes of the time, which were needlessly complex and arbitrarily re-
strictive by modern standards. Even more important to corporate promot-
ers—and in keeping with New Jersey tradition—the act included no pro-
hibitions on trusts, monopolies, or combinations.95 
 As the merger movement accelerated in the mid-1890s, New Jersey 
reaped the fiscal benefits of its liberal corporation act. By several 
measures, the state quickly became the dominant corporate jurisdiction in 
the United States: between 1895 and 1904, 50% of combinations by num-
ber and nearly 80% of combinations by value were incorporated in New 
Jersey.96 Between 1896 and 1901, New Jersey incorporations increased 
nearly 200%, eventually providing more than 60% of the state’s total tax 
revenue.97 By 1904, all seven of financial analyst John Moody’s “greater 
industrial trusts”—the largest corporations in the country—were incorpo-
rated in New Jersey, as were 162 of 311 “lesser” (but still significant) 
trusts.98 Despite its much smaller industrial base compared to wealthier 
states such as New York, New Jersey became infamous as “the cradle of 
monopolies.”99 
                                                  
92   See Yablon, supra note 63 at 344. 
93   See Urofsky, supra note 65 at 163–64. The new act was passed as An Act Concerning 
Corporations, supra note 89 at 277. 
94   See Cary, supra note 2 at 664; Theodore H Davis, Jr, “Corporate Privileges for the Pub-
lic Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regula-
tory State” (1991) 77:3 Va L Rev 603 at 617; Seligman, supra note 3 at 265. Note, how-
ever, that many of the act’s most significant reforms already existed under English (and 
Canadian) law. This was no coincidence, as Dill was an outspoken proponent of the 
English model of corporate law. 
95   See An Act Concerning Corporations, supra note 89 at 277–317. See also Keasbey, su-
pra note 82 at 385. 
96   See Nelson, supra note 47 at 67. The fact that the proportionate value of New Jersey 
combinations exceeded their proportionate number indicates that the country’s largest 
combinations were concentrated in New Jersey. 
97   See Grandy, supra note 29 at 681–82; Urofsky, supra note 65 at 164. 
98   Moody, supra note 79 at 453–69. The “greater industrial trusts” were Amalgamated 
Copper Company, American Smelting and Refining Co., American Sugar Refining Co., 
Consolidated Tobacco Co., International Merchant Marine Company, Standard Oil 
Company, and United States Steel Company. 
99   Testimony Before the Industrial Commission, supra note 49 at 743 (George Rice). 
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 As the merger movement peaked, other states attempted to emulate 
New Jersey’s success. A number of states, including Delaware, Maine, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia, attempted to compete with New Jersey 
by passing similar corporation acts and/or charging lower corporate fran-
chise taxes.100 Even leading industrial states such as New York and Mas-
sachusetts were forced to reform their corporation acts to avoid losing 
corporations to New Jersey or “one of the chartering states.”101 By the first 
decades of the twentieth century, American corporate law was being 
transformed by the pressures of jurisdictional competition.102 Ironically, it 
was the traditional rigour of American corporate law and its hostility to-
ward monopolies that created the opportunity for a race toward corporate 
laxity. 
C. State Law Competition and the Rise of Delaware 
 Given its first-mover advantage, New Jersey was the original leader of 
the American incorporation market. Other states attempted to compete, 
but New Jersey’s leadership position remained secure. Incorporators had 
little reason to venture into untested waters given the predictability and 
reliability of the New Jersey legal system.103 As New Jersey had invested 
heavily in its corporate-friendly reputation, businesses could be reasona-
bly assured it would not engage in radical reform.104 These assurances 
evaporated in the second decade of the twentieth century, however, when 
the New Jersey legislature suddenly passed a series of strict antitrust 
provisions.105 Following this unwelcome political development, the na-
tion’s largest corporations migrated to the state of Delaware—where, by 
and large, they remain today. 
 Prior to New Jersey’s political reversal, Delaware was its most active 
competitor. In 1899, Delaware enacted a corporation act that was sub-
stantially similar to the New Jersey statute.106 The biggest difference be-
                                                  
100  See Yablon, supra note 63 at 358–67. 
101  Ibid at 370. 
102  See ibid at 367–71. 
103  See discussion of James B Dill, “National Incorporation Laws for Trusts” (Address be-
fore the Seminary in Economics of Harvard University, 10 March 1902), (1902) 11:6 
Yale LJ 273 at 281; Keasbey, supra note 82 at 38587, 389; Testimony Before the Indus-
trial Commission, supra note 49 at 964–65 (William H Moore); ibid at 970–71, 975–76 
(Francis Lynde Stetson); ibid at 996 (Elbert H Gary); ibid at 1081–82 (James B Dill); 
ibid at 1109–11 (Charles N King). 
104  See Grandy, supra note 29 at 685–91. 
105  See ibid at 689. 
106  An Act Providing A General Corporation Law, c 273, 21 Del Laws 445 (1899). 
CORPORATE LAW FEDERALISM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 129 
 
 
tween the two states was that Delaware charged lower franchise taxes.107 
Given these lower taxes, Delaware lawyers and corporate service provid-
ers could essentially compete on price, marketing their state as a lower-
cost alternative to New Jersey.108 This strategy saw some, albeit limited, 
success. By the end of the Great Merger Movement, Delaware had at-
tracted thirteen of the country’s major industrial trusts—more than its 
small state competitors such as Maine and West Virginia, but far fewer 
than New Jersey or even traditional industrial states such as New 
York.109 Although Delaware earned a reputation as a corporate-friendly 
jurisdiction, New Jersey continued to lead the incorporation market.110  
 This state of affairs continued until the presidential election of 1912, 
an unusual three-way contest among Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic 
governor of New Jersey, William Howard Taft, the incumbent Republican 
president, and former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt, who ran 
on an independent progressive party ticket.111 Wilson campaigned on a 
Democratic platform of progressive economic reform, a position at odds 
with his home state’s image as the “mother of trusts.”112 When Wilson 
called for stronger antitrust laws on the campaign trail, Roosevelt—who 
was popularly regarded as a “trust buster” for his administration’s prose-
cution of antitrust cases—taunted Wilson for his inaction against the 
trusts during his tenure as New Jersey governor.113 Although Wilson won 
the election, the trust issue remained a source of political embarrassment. 
In his final annual message as governor of New Jersey, Wilson called for 
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legislation to bring corporations under stricter control.114 The Democrat-
controlled state legislature obliged, passing seven broad antitrust provi-
sions in early 1913.115 Among other restrictions, these provisions prohibit-
ed any “combination or agreement between corporations, firms, or per-
sons” in restraint of trade; the purchase, holding, or disposition by any 
corporation of the securities of any competing corporation; and price dis-
crimination between different buyers, markets, or areas within the 
state.116 These enactments, known popularly as the “seven sisters,” were 
an abrupt and unexpected shift in New Jersey’s policy toward corpora-
tions,117 imposing many of the same antitrust restrictions that firms came 
to New Jersey to avoid. Virtually overnight, New Jersey transformed from 
a corporate haven to a minefield of legal and political risk. 
 The reaction was foreseeable. Following enactment of the seven sis-
ters, New Jersey incorporations declined as firms opted for other states. 
Delaware was the primary beneficiary of this shift, likely because its cor-
poration act was so similar to New Jersey’s.118 During the period 1912–
1920, annual incorporations in Delaware increased more than 400% (from 
1,427 to 5,747), while annual corporation revenues increased over 900% 
(from $168,244 to $1,570,620).119 Over the same period, New Jersey’s cor-
poration revenues gradually declined, as new corporations shunned the 
state and existing corporations choose to leave it.120 
 Realizing the consequences of its actions, the New Jersey legislature 
attempted to reverse course by weakening the seven sisters in 1917.121 
The damage had already been done, however. By enacting the seven sis-
ters, New Jersey irreparably damaged its pro-corporate reputation.122 Re-
versing its decision could not restore the business community’s trust.123 
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Delaware, New Jersey’s closest competitor, was able to capture its leader-
ship position.124 In the decades since, the corporate laws of most American 
states have become increasingly similar to that of Delaware—itself origi-
nally based on the 1896 New Jersey act. In this fashion, the Great Merger 
Movement played an important role in the direction of US corporate law. 
By placing intense economic and political pressure on legal restrictions 
upon corporate power, it gave rise to the jurisdictional competition that 
led to those restrictions’ eventual repeal. 
II. Industrial Consolidation and Canadian Corporate Law 
 The demographic, technological, and economic developments that led 
to the Great Merger Movement were not unique to the United States. 
Similar developments also occurred in other industrialized countries—
including Canada, Great Britain, and Germany—though the timing and 
intensity of merger activity varied.125 In Canada, the pattern of industrial 
consolidation was similar to that of the United States. Although the mer-
ger movement in Canada was much smaller in absolute size, it was com-
parable in proportion to the size of the national economy.126 The greatest 
difference between the two countries is when their merger movements oc-
curred. While the Great Merger Movement in the United States lasted 
from 1895 to 1904 (peaking in 1899),127 the first Canadian merger wave 
occurred roughly a decade later, from 1909 to 1913 (peaking in 1910).128 
The reasons for this lapse were primarily economic—the Canadian 
movement arrived later due to the country’s smaller economy, slower pace 
of industrialization, and less-developed capital market.129 It was not until 
the “Laurier boom” of the first decade of the twentieth century, and the 
resulting flow of foreign capital into Canadian equity securities, that 
“tight” combinations became financially viable.130 The legal environment 
was also a factor. In general, Canadian businesses faced fewer constraints 
on price fixing and cartelization, reducing their incentives to merge. As 
discussed below, the delayed onset of the Canadian merger movement had 
important consequences—by the time of the 1909–1913 merger wave, Ca-
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nadian law had already experienced significant liberalization, precluding 
the jurisdictional competition witnessed in the United States. 
 The American and Canadian merger movements make for a particu-
larly useful historical comparison due to the similarity of their economic 
causes and the differences in their legal effects. Although the American 
economy was much larger, the two countries’ merger movements were 
otherwise similar from an economic perspective. Both countries featured 
(1) expansive geographic territories, (2) diversified economies based on ag-
riculture, commodities, and industrial manufacturing, and (3) a shared 
Anglo-Saxon commercial tradition. These similarities influenced the in-
dustries that were most likely to consolidate, including rail transporta-
tion; food processing; agricultural and transportation equipment; and ce-
ment, steel, and other heavy manufacturing industries.131 In the United 
States, this consolidation was primarily financed by a growing domestic 
capital market, while Canadian mergers relied much more heavily on for-
eign (primarily British) capital.132 In both countries mergers took similar 
forms, with promoters arranging combinations of large numbers of small-
er competitors.133 Although the specific economic events that precipitated 
the movements were different—the American movement being a direct 
response to the financial panic of 1893—the broader economic motivations 
in both countries were similar: to organize firms large enough to meaning-
fully reduce market competition.134 
 Notwithstanding these similarities, the American and Canadian mer-
ger movements occurred in different legal and political contexts. In the 
United States, a long tradition of political hostility toward concentrated 
economic power meant that state law often tightly restricted corpora-
tions.135 In Canada, the situation was less antagonistic. Although populist 
“anti-combines” sentiment certainly existed, it failed to influence govern-
ment policy to the same extent as in the United States. For this reason, 
the wide variety of antitrust provisions common in US state corporation 
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laws never appeared in Canadian federal and provincial incorporation 
acts. As discussed in this Part, the permissiveness of Canadian law dur-
ing the first Canadian merger wave had important institutional conse-
quences: given the absence of major legal obstacles to consolidating mer-
gers, there was little pressure on Canadian jurisdictions to engage in reg-
ulatory competition, and thus little likelihood of the organic emergence of 
a “Canadian New Jersey.” 
A. Canadian Anti-Combines Law 
 Many of the same political factors that led to antitrust legislation in 
the United States were also present in Canada. Throughout the late nine-
teenth century, Canadian businesses actively sought to limit competition 
through the use of cartels, industry agreements, and other forms of pric-
ing collusion.136 These practices were encouraged by Canada’s “National 
Policy” of protective tariffs, which facilitated domestic price fixing by lim-
iting foreign competition.137 As many businesses engaged in open re-
straints of trade, Canadian consumers—facing artificially high prices—
grew increasingly resentful.138 Echoing political developments in the 
United States, the strongest opposition to anticompetitive business prac-
tices came from western farmers, who blamed the railways, industrial 
cartels, and eastern capital generally for their high input and distribution 
costs.139 Nevertheless, western agricultural populism was weaker in Can-
ada than the United States, where it grew into a national political move-
ment.140 In Canada, despite widespread resentment toward large corpora-
tions, legal reform was staunchly (and successfully) opposed by business 
interests, with which the Canadian political elite was broadly sympathet-
ic.141 
 Although Parliament passed a series of anti-combines acts in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their purpose and effect were 
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largely symbolic.142 In response to public outcry over a particularly nox-
ious grocers’ cartel, combines became a parliamentary issue in the late 
1880s. In 1888, Conservative MP Nathaniel Clarke Wallace called for the 
creation of a parliamentary committee to investigate the “nature, extent 
and effect of certain combinations.”143 Once formed, the committee con-
ducted extensive hearings and issued a voluminous parliamentary report 
documenting the existence of anticompetitive cartels in at least eleven 
major industries.144 Although the committee determined that the evils of 
combines were not yet as advanced as in the United States, it neverthe-
less recommended parliamentary action to prevent existing combines 
from growing any stronger.145 Following the report, Wallace introduced an 
anti-combines bill which became law (in amended form) in early 1889.146 
 The material language of the anti-combines act was contained in sec-
tion 1: 
1. Every person who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with 
any other person, or with any railway, steamship, steamboat or 
transportation company, unlawfully— 
(a) to unduly limit the facilities for transporting, producing, 
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article or 
commodity which may be a subject of trade and commerce; or— 
(b) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any such 
article or commodity; or— 
(c) to unduly prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or produc-
tion of any such article or commodity, or to unreasonably en-
hance the price thereof; or— 
(d) to unduly prevent or lessen competition in the production, 
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, transportation or supply of 
any such article or commodity, or in the price of insurance upon 
person or property— 
Is guilty of a misdemeanor and liable on conviction, to a penalty not 
exceeding four thousand dollars and not less than two hundred dol-
lars, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years; and if 
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a corporation, is liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding ten 
thousand dollars and not less than one thousand dollars.147 
 From a legal standpoint, little in the act was actually new. It was es-
sentially a reformulation of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, 
with the addition of criminal penalties.148 Arguably, the act weakened ex-
isting common law prohibitions, as it was conditioned throughout by qual-
ifying language such as “unlawfully,” “unduly,” and “unreasonably.”149 It 
also provided no resources for investigation or prosecution, begging the 
question of enforcement. The act appears to have been passed primarily 
for its expressive value, Wallace proclaiming that “the Parliament of Can-
ada have put on record their condemnation of [restraints of trade].”150 
Whatever Parliament’s intent, the language of the act rang hollow as a 
source of effective criminal prohibitions. In the words of Richard Gosse, 
“not only did a criminal offence have to be committed, it had to be commit-
ted ‘unduly.’”151 
 Unsurprisingly, the act had little effect. Its greatest weakness was its 
lack of an enforcement mechanism. As a general criminal statute, prose-
cutions under the act were the responsibility of provincial Attorneys Gen-
eral, who—likely recognizing the act’s infirmity—simply ignored it.152 On-
ly a single indictment was brought in the entire first decade of the act’s 
existence, resulting in an acquittal.153 Although Wallace and other like-
minded MPs sought to strengthen the act in the 1890s, Wallace’s pro-
posed amendments were defeated by the business lobby. Canadian busi-
ness interests, which wielded significant influence in Parliament, claimed 
“reasonable” restrictions on competition were necessary for their viabil-
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ity.154 Following several failed attempts, the federal anti-combines act was 
finally strengthened in 1900,155 but enforcement remained limited.156 Into 
the early twentieth century, Canadian business continued to be character-
ized by “loose” combinations among competing firms. 
 Circumstances changed, however, with the arrival of the Canadian 
merger movement, roughly a decade after the United States. Suddenly, 
mergers became the dominant means of limiting competition. Although 
comprehensive data on Canadian mergers are unavailable, Gregory 
Marchildon has estimated that during the years 1909−1913, at least 195 
industrial firms disappeared in at least seventy-one distinct transac-
tions.157 Many of these transactions combined multiple competing firms 
into a single industry-wide monopoly, the same pattern observed in the 
United States. The logic behind consolidation in the two countries was the 
same—by combining competing firms, promoters could offer outside in-
vestors the promise of monopoly profits.158 
 Despite similar motivations, the specific events triggering the move-
ments in Canada and the United States were different. The American 
movement began in the wake of a serious economic depression, in a legal 
environment in which antitrust policy discouraged agreements to main-
tain prices. In Canada, the merger movement was an organic response to 
the inherent instability of such agreements, made possible by the econom-
ic boom of the early twentieth century. As the economy grew, it became 
increasingly apparent to Canadian businesses that “loose” combinations 
such as cartels and trade associations were difficult to enforce. As econom-
ic theory would predict, the higher a cartel attempted to set prices, the 
greater the temptation for its members to cheat. Unsanctioned price cut-
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ting by cartel members was rampant, undermining cartels’ effectiveness 
and often leading to their dissolution. “Tight” combinations eliminated 
this problem by bringing competition within a single firm. It was not until 
the economic boom of the early twentieth century, however, that promot-
ers gained access to the large amounts of capital required to finance mer-
gers. Once this capital became available, mergers arose as a natural evo-
lution of long-standing efforts to limit competition.159  
 These differences in competition policy between Canada and the Unit-
ed States had important consequences for the development of corporate 
law. In the United States, antitrust law was an important factor in juris-
dictional selection. When early decisions under the Sherman Act struck 
down “loose” pricing and output agreements, corporations gravitated to 
the jurisdiction most amenable to “tight” combinations—New Jersey. In 
Canada, on the other hand, competition law had little bearing on the 
structure of the merger movement. As discussed above, cartels had shown 
their practical limitations as a means of controlling competition.160 At the 
same time, tariff increases in 1907 further disadvantaged foreign imports, 
increasing potential monopoly profits and encouraging domestic consoli-
dation.161 Most importantly, buoyant conditions in the securities markets 
and greater availability of foreign capital—both results of Canada’s ongo-
ing economic boom—provided the necessary financing.162 Together, these 
multiple factors set the stage for the 1909–1913 merger movement. 
 When it finally arrived, the sudden wave of industrial consolidation 
led to renewed calls for stronger anti-combines law.163 The Liberal gov-
ernment of Wilfrid Laurier responded by proposing a new bill “to provide 
for the investigating of combines, monopolies, trusts and mergers which 
may enhance prices or restrict competition to the detriment of consum-
ers.”164 This bill, introduced in 1910 by Minister of Labour (and future 
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Prime Minster) William Lyon Mackenzie King, addressed the enforce-
ment problem that had plagued previous anti-combines acts by empower-
ing private citizens to initiate judicial investigations of combinations.165 
The bill was also broader in scope than previous anti-combines acts, en-
compassing “all forms of combination” including “monopolies, trusts, mer-
gers and combines.”166 This language was more expansive than the act of 
1889, which, by its terms, was arguably limited to “loose” arrangements 
among independent companies. Notwithstanding these reforms, the bill’s 
policy ambitions were limited. According to King, the bill was “not aimed 
against combines or mergers as such,” but merely against their exercise of 
power “in an unfair manner.”167 Like many Liberals, King believed indus-
trial consolidation was a natural aspect of economic progress, which so 
long as it was properly regulated, stood to benefit society as a whole. King 
therefore declined to follow the Sherman Act, which some Canadian law-
makers considered overly restrictive.168 King’s bill, successfully passed in 
1910 as the Combines Investigation Act, reflected the ambivalence at the 
heart of Canadian competition policy. Despite the act’s broader language 
and its inclusion of judicial investigations, it provided no effective mecha-
nism for enforcement of its terms.169 The act was successful from a politi-
cal standpoint, in that it signaled the government’s ostensible concern, 
but it had almost no practical impact. It was invoked only once (against 
an American company) before being repealed in 1919.170 
 This is all to say that Canadian competition law had little effect on in-
dustrial organization. Although Canadian businesses eventually adopted 
the “tight” organizational structures common in the United States, their 
reasons for doing so were primarily related to exogenous economic factors, 
rather than changes in competition law.171 Indeed, given the timing of the 
initial merger wave (beginning in 1909) and the passage of the Combines 
Investigation Act (adopted in 1910), it is more likely economic changes in-
fluenced legislation than the other way around. Of course, anti-combines 
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legislation was only one aspect of the regulatory environment—company 
law, discussed below, played an equally important role. 
B.  Canadian Company Law 
 Beyond anti-combines legislation, company law played a major role in 
Canadian merger activity. Two characteristics of Canadian law stand out: 
first, unlike the United States, Canada enacted federal legislation regard-
ing the creation of limited companies. Canadian promoters therefore had 
access to a national body of corporate law. Second, by 1909, Canadian law 
was less restrictive than the traditional corporate law of most American 
states. Since federal company law—available anywhere across the coun-
try—imposed few restrictions on mergers, neither corporate promoters 
nor the provinces themselves had reason to advance an alternative sys-
tem. More than any other factor, it was the permissive nature of company 
law at the time of the Canadian merger movement that precluded the ju-
risdictional competition experienced in the United States. 
 Canada’s tradition of parallel federal and provincial corporate law 
emerges from the Confederation period. By its terms, the British North 
America Act, 1867 granted the power of incorporation solely to the prov-
inces, providing them exclusive authority to form “Companies with Pro-
vincial Objects.”172 However, the federal division of power under the Ca-
nadian constitution system—by which the provinces are granted plenary 
authority over specific enumerated subjects, and all subjects not so enu-
merated are reserved to the national government—left open the possibil-
ity that the Dominion government could incorporate companies with na-
tional objects.173 Although the existence of this power was uncertain, the 
Parliament of Canada passed a joint stock companies act shortly following 
Confederation.174 The federal act was largely based on preexisting legisla-
tion of the Province of Canada, itself derived from a combination of Eng-
lish and American influences.175 The federal act was amended several 
times over subsequent decades, but its structure remained grounded in 
Confederation-era legislation.  
                                                  
172  Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(11), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appen-
dix II, No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
173  In the 1881 case of Citizens Insurance Company of Canada and The Queen Insurance 
Company v Parsons [1881] UKPC 49 [Parsons], the Privy Council confirmed as a mat-
ter of constitutional law that the federal government was empowered to create compa-
nies with extra-provincial objects. 
174  See Canada Joint Stock Companies Letters Patent Act, 1869, SC 1869, c 13 [CJSCLPA]. 
175  See AW Currie, “The First Dominion Companies Act” (1962) 28:3 Can J Econ & Pol Sci 
387 at 401–02 . 
140   (2018) 64:1   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
  
 Like the provincial statute on which it was based, the first federal 
companies act featured a distinctive “letters patent” system, by which 
companies were formed under the executive authority of the Governor-in-
Council.176 Although the letters patent system was unique to Canada, it 
was similar to English law in its approach to corporate governance.177 
Both English and Canadian law permitted wide discretion in organizing 
company affairs and imposed relatively few restrictions on substantive 
business activities. This was in contrast with many American states, 
which generally imposed stricter limits on size, structure, and business 
practices. These differences are evident from comparing (1) the Canadian 
Companies Act, 1902,178 (2) the English Companies Acts, 1862 to 1907,179 
and (3) the state corporation acts described in Annex A. Although their 
details varied, English and Canadian company law were broadly similar 
in that neither included the antitrust provisions that were common in 
American statutes.180 If anything, the Canadian act was even more per-
missive than English legislation.  
 None of this to say Canadian law was a model of corporate liberalism, 
however. Prior to the Companies Act, 1902, incorporating a business was 
an onerous, time-consuming process, requiring application to the Secre-
tary of State and a full month’s prior notice in the Canada Gazette.181 Ear-
ly Canadian law also made consolidation difficult. As in many US states, 
the pre-1902 stock companies act prohibited intercompany stock purchas-
es, preventing companies from using their funds to acquire the shares of 
other companies.182 The federal act also required that a majority of direc-
tors be resident Canadians and subjects of the Crown, which likely dis-
couraged foreign investment.183 Indeed, although the delay in the Canadi-
                                                  
176  In practice, this authority was exercised by the Secretary of State. 
177  For discussion of the letters patent system, see Currie, supra note 175 at 400–02. For 
discussion of philosophical/theoretical differences between the letters patent system 
and the English memorandum-registration system, see Bruce Welling, Lionel Smith & 
Leonard I Rotman, Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes & Materials, 4th ed (Mark-
ham: LexisNexis, 2010) at 110–18. 
178  SC 1902, c 15 [The Companies Act, 1902]. 
179  English company law was consolidated in 1862 and further modernized in subsequent 
acts: see John D Turner, “The Development of English Company Law Before 1900” in 
Harwell Wells, ed, Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgard, 2018) 121 at 135.  
180  The exception being New Jersey and the other states that sought to emulate it. 
181  See CJSCLPA, supra note 174, s 4. This lengthy incorporation process was one of the 
primary motivations for reforming the act in 1902 (see supra notes 184−191 and ac-
companying text). 
182  See ibid, s 41. 
183  See ibid, s 18. 
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an merger movement was primarily due to economic factors, restrictions 
in Canadian company law may have also played a role.  
 As the years passed, the federal joint stock companies act was amend-
ed several times, but major changes to its core provisions did not arrive 
until 1902, with the passage of the revised and restated Companies Act, 
1902. These revisions significantly liberalized Canadian company law. 
The most important changes “assimilated the law of Canada to the law of 
England, and removed many obstructions to the obtaining of charters 
which formerly existed under [the] old statute.”184 Parliament’s intentions 
in revising the act were unmistakably pro-business. The goal of the revi-
sions was to maximize the freedom of “private enterprises to unite togeth-
er” and to remove “any obstructions or obstacles” to the formation of joint 
stock companies.185 In this spirit, the act simplified the incorporation pro-
cess and removed any requirement of prior public notice.186 According to 
Liberal Senator and Secretary of State Richard Scott, the primary drafter 
of the act, the reforms greatly simplified federal law, reducing the incor-
poration process from a matter of months to a matter of days.187 The act 
also included broader reforms intended to attract companies to Canada. 
For example, the act expressly provided that foreign companies could re-
incorporate under Canadian law, a provision meant to attract British and 
American capital.188 For similar reasons, the requirement that company 
directors be Canadian residents or British subjects was removed.189 Final-
ly, although the act adopted the English rule allowing shareholders to ini-
tiate judicial inspections, the Canadian legislation—unlike the English 
companies acts—did not require full public disclosure.190 Canadian law-
                                                  
184  According to Charles M. Holt, a leading Montreal commercial practitioner (see Charles 
M Holt, “The Canada Companies’ Act, 1902” (1902) 2:2 Can L Rev 71 at 71). 
185  “Bill (R), An act respecting the incorporation of Joint Stock Companies by Letters Pa-
tent”, 1st reading, Debates of the Senate, 9-2 (8 April 1902) at 169 (Hon Richard Scott) 
[Senate Debates, 8 April 1902]. 
186  See The Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178,  s 5–10. 
187  See Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 169 (Hon Richard Scott); “Bill (R.), 
An Act respecting the incorporation of Joint Stock Companies by letters patent”, De-
bates of the Senate, 2nd reading, 9:2, vol 1 (17 April 1902) at 233–34 (Hon Richard 
Scott) [Senate Debates, 17 April 1902]. 
188  See The Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 13; Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, su-
pra note 185 at 171−72 (Hon Richard Scott). 
189  See Senate Debates, Debates of the Senate, 9-2 (22 April 1902) [Senate Debates, 22 April 
1902] at 278. Ironically, a requirement that at least twenty-five per cent of directors be 
Canadian residents was reinserted into the CBCA in 2001 in response to increasing 
foreign investment in Canada. See CBCA, supra note 8, s 105(3); An Act to amend the 
Canada Business Corporations Act and the Canada Cooperatives Act and to amend oth-
er Acts in consequence, SC 2001, c 14, s 37. 
190  See The Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 79. 
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makers felt that public disclosure was overly burdensome, especially for 
smaller firms.191 
 Under the revised act, companies enjoyed a variety of means of com-
bining into larger firms. Some of these methods already existed, while 
others were introduced by the 1902 revisions. Under existing law, Cana-
dian companies had long been able to purchase the assets of other 
firms,192 a common means of transferring a business from one corporate 
owner to another.193 Under the 1902 act, companies were also empowered 
to purchase and hold company stock, if authorized by their letters patent 
or by-laws.194 This power allowed holding companies to purchase the stock 
of independent firms, consolidating separate businesses under a single 
corporate ownership structure. Companies were also permitted to issue 
shares in exchange for property, allowing them to finance acquisitions by 
issuing their own stock.195 Together, these powers enabled promoters to 
organize combinations by (1) forming a holding company (or using an ex-
isting firm as a holding company) and (2) acquiring competing businesses, 
using the holding company’s shares as consideration.196 This acquisition 
process was similar to the merger structure used by New Jersey corpora-
tions.197 Indeed, James B. Dill was cited in Parliament as an instructive 
American authority.198 A final method of combining firms was legal 
“amalgamation,” the melding of two companies into one. Although the 
Companies Act, 1902 did not specifically address amalgamation, it was 
apparently permitted under general law if both companies claimed the 
                                                  
191  See Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 172 (Hon James Alexander 
Lougheed). 
192  See Victor E Mitchell, A Treatise on the Law Relating to Canadian Commercial Corpo-
rations (Montreal: Southam Press, 1916) at 1210–16, 1397. 
193  See Curtis, supra note 162 at 6–7. 
194  See The Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 35. 
195  See Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 148, 166, 169 (this technique is 
described with respect to the notorious Canada Cement Company Ltd. merger). 
196  Companies could also be acquired by issuing other forms of securities, including pre-
ferred stock, bonds, and so forth (see Mitchell, supra note 192 at 1392–97). In the par-
liamentary debates on the Companies Act, 1902, there was confusion over whether the 
legislation actually allowed this practice. According to Senator Scott, s 6(g) of the act, 
which required disclosure of the method by which the company’s shares were pur-
chased, implied that shares could be validly acquired by tendering shares of another 
company. Apparently, this argument satisfied his colleagues, as more specific language 
was never added. See discussion in Debates of the Senate, 17 April 1902, supra note 187 
at 236–38. 
197  See Grandy, supra note 29 at 681. 
198  See Senate Debates 17 April 1902, supra note 187 at 238 (James Alexander Lougheed). 
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power in their letters patent.199 That said, true amalgamations were rare. 
Instead, combinations were typically organized as stock or asset purchas-
es.200 
 The legislative history of the 1902 act reveals its pro-business orienta-
tion. The parliamentary debates surrounding the act showed strong sup-
port for joint stock companies.201 Senator Scott stated explicitly that the 
goal of the legislation was to attract joint stock companies to Canada, par-
ticularly those financed by British and American capital.202 He specifically 
praised English law for attracting “enormous sums of money” to that 
country in the form of corporate investment.203 In the House of Commons, 
Clifford Sifton, the minister of the interior, expressed a similar view, stat-
ing that “in respect to that class of companies which can be described as 
industrial companies every possible facility should be given for incorpora-
tion” and that “incorporation should be made as speedy, as free from un-
necessary difficulty and as inexpensive as possible.”204 
 Equally as significant as these positive views was the notable absence 
of anti-corporate political rhetoric. Unlike the United States—where lead-
ing figures in the Democratic Party sought harsh restrictions on corpora-
tions, and even the most pro-business Republicans felt compelled to de-
nounce corporate excesses—there was little discussion in the Parliament 
of Canada of limiting the power of joint stock companies. At a time when 
fear of corporate monopoly was at a high point in American politics, Ca-
nadian politicians were instead concerned with encouraging capital for-
mation. What can explain these differences? First, in 1902, Canada had 
not yet experienced the massive combinations that dominated the US 
economy.205 For this simple reason, controlling combinations was less of a 
concern among the Canadian electorate.206 Although Canadians certainly 
                                                  
199  See ibid at 237–38; Mitchell, supra note 192 at 1375–76. 
200  See Curtis, supra note 162 at 6–7. 
201  But see the comments of Senator James McMullen at Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, 
supra note 189 at 270−71 (James McMullen).  
202  See Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 171–72 (Hon Richard William 
Scott).  
203  Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 at 272 (Hon Richard William Scott). 
204  “Bill (No. 16) respecting the incorporation of Joint Stock Companies by letters patent”, 
House of Commons Debates, 9-2, vol 57 (15 May 1902) at 5057 (Hon Clifford Sutton) 
[House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1902]. 
205  See Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 254. 
206  The ambivalent attitude toward combinations and competition is described in Bagga-
ley, supra note 153 at 20–21. The politics of the National Policy, which promoted do-
mestic combinations by limiting foreign competition, are described in Bliss, A Living 
Profit, supra note 136 at 95–113. 
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resented cartels, the economy had not yet experienced the outright mo-
nopolization of entire industries.207 Second, to a greater extent than in the 
United States, Canadian politics was dominated by a conservative, patri-
cian political elite which was generally sympathetic to the country’s busi-
ness and financial community.208 Not only were the parliamentary de-
bates on the Companies Act, 1902 marked by general pro-business senti-
ment, but several lawmakers discussed the bill in terms of their own in-
volvement in forming companies.209 This sympathy toward the business 
class was reflected throughout Canadian economic policy, as illustrated by 
the lack of effective prohibitions on price and output collision, the award-
ing of public “bonuses” for private economic development, and—last but 
not least—the National Policy itself, which benefited Canadian producers 
at the expense of Canadian consumers.210 A final factor may have been the 
peripheral status of Canada itself, which remained less developed than 
both the British metropole and the rapidly developing United States.211 
Although Canada was a prosperous country by world standards, its rela-
tive underdevelopment compared to its two primary trading partners may 
have contributed to a political culture particularly amenable to industrial 
support. Whatever the exact reasons, the Canadian government was pri-
marily concerned with helping, not hindering, joint stock companies.212 
                                                  
207  Thus, according to Canadian businessmen, “evil” combinations were limited to the 
United States (Bliss, A Living Profit, supra note 136 at 46). When monopolization did 
arrive with the merger movement in 1909, Canadians were incensed (see Marchildon, 
Promotion, Finance and Mergers, supra note 132 at 134–39). 
208  See Bliss, “Another Anti-Trust Tradition”, supra note 137 at 186–87; Naylor, supra note 
161 at xxxi, 4, 57–58, 86. 
209  See e.g. Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 170–72; Senate Debates, 17 
April 1902, supra note 187 at 236, 238; Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 
at 266, 275, 276, 280. Beyond Senator Scott, who as Secretary of State had experience 
with the incorporation process from the perspective of the government, Senators Dan-
durand, Lougheed, and Béique were each accomplished solicitors who were routinely 
involved in forming companies.  
210  See generally Naylor, supra note 161 at 187, 193–94. Although high tariffs also existed 
in the United States, they were far more controversial. Second only to corporations 
themselves, tariffs were one of the primary targets of populist political agitation. At the 
turn of the century, for example, tariff reduction was a central plank of the Democratic 
Party (see Camden Hutchison, “The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction” 
(2015) 18:3 Fla Tax Rev 95 at 115). 
211  See Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 257. 
212  Note that my assessment of Canadian law is at odds with that of Fenner Stewart, who 
has argued that the effectiveness of Canadian company law was hindered by differences 
between letters patent and memorandum jurisdictions. See generally Fenner L Stew-
art, “A History of Canadian Corporate Law: A Divergent Path from the American Mod-
el?” in Harwell Wells, ed, Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company 
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 451. According to Stewart, these differences 
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 Although Canadian lawmakers’ major concern was encouraging busi-
ness development, revenue considerations were also important. In fact, 
the politics surrounding the Companies Act, 1902 display elements of the 
jurisdictional competition witnessed in the United States. By the turn of 
the century, Ontario had surpassed the federal government in enacting 
company law reform, such that it had become easier to incorporate under 
Ontario law than under federal legislation.213 During the years 
1895−1900, Ontario’s incorporation revenues grew nearly 500% as an in-
creasing number of businesses chose to incorporate in the province.214 
Given the rapid increase in provincial incorporations, there was concern 
within Parliament that the slow, cumbersome nature of the federal incor-
poration process was discouraging its use by businesses. During the de-
bates on the 1902 act, Senator Scott argued that Ontario law had become 
more attractive than federal incorporation. To make his point, Scott gave 
the example of “[o]ne of the largest companies recently established” in 
Canada, which, although based in Quebec, had chosen to incorporate in 
Ontario.215 According to Scott, the company would have preferred to “come 
to Ottawa,” but the existing federal legislation was inadequate to its 
needs.216 It appears that Scott and other officials believed the federal gov-
ernment was failing to provide an important service. There was even con-
cern that Canadian companies might be leaving for the United States. In 
the words of Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior: 
The effect of the law as it exists at the present time has been to drive 
the business away from the federal government. Persons have been 
compelled to go to the various provinces and the various states of the 
Union for the purpose of getting charters of incorporation. It will be 
agreed by the House that we should have our law in such a state 
      
had the effect of “distracting jurists, judges, regulators, and lawyers with issues of need-
less complexity” (ibid at 458). 
213  It was widely believed at the time that Ontario company law reform had led to an in-
crease in Ontario incorporations: see Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 
at 265 (Hon Richard William Scott); House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1902, supra 
note 204 at 5057−58 (Hon Clifford Sifton); “Big Increase in Receipts: Revenue From In-
corporation of Joint Stock Companies Grows Enormously in the Last Five Years”, The 
Globe (4 January 1900) 7 [“Big Increase in Receipts”]. See also “Ontario Companies: 
Rapid Increase in the Number Incorporated”, The Globe (16 August 1902) 28. In the 
federal parliamentary debates on the Companies Act, 1902, British Columbia and Nova 
Scotia, which had each adopted companies acts inspired by English legislation, were al-
so mentioned as potential sources of competition. See Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, su-
pra note 185 at 170 (Hon Richard William Scott). 
214  See “Big Increase in Receipts”, supra note 213. 
215  Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 at 265 (Hon Richard William Scott). Scott 
stated that incorporation under Quebec law was not a viable option, as Quebec had “an 
old-fashioned law that nobody can work under” (ibid). 
216  Ibid. 
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that persons would not have to go somewhere else to get a charter to 
do business in Canada.217 
 The possibility of competition between the federal government and the 
provinces was a source of controversy within Parliament. Different law-
makers had different views on the appropriate scope of federal legislation, 
some considering it a source of revenue, others considering it a threat to 
the provinces.218 For example, former prime minister Mackenzie Bowell 
suggested the goal of reform was to “get more money.”219 Similarly, future 
prime minister Robert Borden proposed reducing incorporation fees be-
cause “the fees secured by the government would be more if they were 
somewhat lower.”220 On the one hand, these statements suggest that at 
least some MPs conceived federal incorporation as a source of revenue. On 
the other hand, several legislators warned that increasing federal incor-
porations would deprive the provinces of needed funds. Conservative Sen-
ator Josiah Wood opposed federal incorporation altogether, claiming it 
would “take away from the provinces a source of revenue that is of consid-
erable importance to many of the smaller provinces.”221 Liberal Senator 
James McMullen raised similar concerns, warning that a reduction in 
provincial revenues could destabilize Canada’s provincial revenue trans-
fer system.222 In response to Senator Wood, Senator Scott, the architect of 
the bill, assured the Senate that federal incorporation fees would be set 
“at least as high as, if not higher than the provinces” so as not to cannibal-
ize provincial revenues.223 As passed, the act’s intent seemed to be that 
large, national firms would incorporate federally, while smaller, more lo-
cal firms would incorporate under provincial law. 
                                                  
217  House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1902, supra note 204 at 5057 (Hon Clifford Sifton). 
218  See Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 at 263−67. The primary source of in-
corporation revenues (for both the federal government and the provinces) was evidently 
chartering fees, as this was the only source of revenue discussed in the parliamentary 
debates (ibid). 
219  Senate Debates, 17 April 1902, supra note 187 at 233 (Sir Mackenzie Bowell). 
220  House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1902, supra note 204 at 5060 (Hon Robert L Bor-
den). 
221  Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 at 263 (Hon Josiah Wood). Senator Wood 
represented New Brunswick. 
222  See ibid at 267 (Hon J McMullen). 
223  Ibid at 265 (Hon Richard William Scott). This issue—the reduction of provincial reve-
nues due to competition from federal law—has remained relevant into the contempo-
rary period. See Daniels, supra note 10 at 168−69, who suggests that the federal gov-
ernment may have increased incorporation fees in 1985 in order to reduce its competi-
tiveness and allow Quebec greater market share. If Daniels is correct, this phenomenon 
is best understood as the literal opposite of competition. 
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 Such were Parliament’s intentions. What, then, was the practical ef-
fect of the Companies Act, 1902? Although the empirical evidence is thin, 
the act appears to have been successful in encouraging federal incorpora-
tion. A 1902 Globe224 article praising the new act reported that companies 
could now be formed in as little as 48 hours. According to The Globe, the 
act’s reforms were “highly appreciated” by the Canadian business and le-
gal communities.225 A year later, The Globe reported incorporations in 
Canada had reached unprecedented levels.226 However, this tally included 
all joint stock companies—both federal and provincial—making it difficult 
to determine the extent to which the increase was attributable to federal 
reform. During the 5-year period of 1899−1903, there were 285 federal in-
corporations with a total capitalization of over $70 million.227 Over the 
same period, there were 339 Ontario incorporations with a total capitali-
zation of over $92 million.228 News reports from later years suggest the 
1902 act may have been succesful in attracting new investment, both from 
within Canada and abroad.229 Again, however, the share of companies 
that incorporated federally as opposed to provincially is unclear. 
 This proportion becomes clearer in the context of the 1909−1913 mer-
ger wave. As Canadian industry consolidated, more than half of Canada’s 
largest firms incorporated under federal law, suggesting its attractiveness 
to Canadian promoters. Although comprehensive historical data on feder-
al incorporations are unavailable, I was able to estimate the percentage of 
large Canadian combinations that incorporated federally by cross-
referencing Gregory Marchildon’s 1885−1918 industrial merger series230 
against federal incorporation records from Library and Archives Cana-
da.231 Based on this estimate, 97 of 174—roughly 56%—of large combina-
                                                  
224  Predecessor to The Globe and Mail. 
225  “Welcomed at Ottawa: The New Companies Act”, The Globe (26 July 1902) 9. 
226  See “Hundreds of Millions Invested by Canadians: During Past Four Years”, The Globe 
(8 April 1903) 4. 
227  See ibid. 
228  See ibid. 
229  See e.g. “Britain’s Small Gain from Canadian Tariff: Decrease in its Trade Not Wholly 
Stopped by Favors”, The New York Times (27 November 1905) 5; “More U.S. Compa-
nies: American Corporations are Entering Canada”, The Globe (17 August 1903) 10. See 
also “New Enterprise Starts: MacMillans to Have a Branch in Canada”, The Globe (26 
December 1905) 9.  
230  See Marchildon, Promotion, Finance and Mergers, supra note 132 at 262–66. Marchil-
don describes his sources and methods (ibid at 175−88). 
231  To perform this estimate, I used the following procedure: first, I relied on Marchildon’s 
merger series as a sample of large combinations formed between 1885 and 1918. The 
Marchildon series includes 174 distinct mergers, primarily in manufacturing indus-
tries. Although not comprehensive (the series is skewed toward the largest mergers), 
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tions were incorporated federally.232 When limiting the analysis to the 
years 1909–1913, this figure becomes 50 of 71, or roughly 70%. Because 
the Marchildon series includes valuation estimates for only a small num-
ber of combinations, it is impossible to calculate similar percentages based 
on total transaction value. That said, there is reason to believe that the 
largest combinations were the most likely to incorporate federally, imply-
ing that the share of federal corporations would be even greater on a val-
uation basis. Judging from an impressionistic review of the companies in 
the Marchildon series, large, well-known combinations such as Canadian 
Canners, Limited, the Dominion Bridge Company, and the Dominion Cot-
ton Mills Company tended to use the federal act, while smaller and more 
obscure combinations such as “Badgerow Faulkner Vinegar Manufactur-
ing Company,” “Berlin Brush Works,” and “Edward Partington Pulp and 
Paper Company Ltd.” tended to use provincial acts. Although difficult to 
verify quantitatively, this pattern suggests that larger combinations were 
particularly attracted to federal law. Moreover, additional evidence sug-
gests federal law maintained its appeal over time. According to C. A. Cur-
tis, between 1921 and 1933, the years encompassing the second Canadian 
merger wave, the percentage of combinations incorporating federally re-
mained greater than 66%.233 
 There are several reasons corporate promoters may have preferred 
federal law. First, at the time of the first merger wave, the ability of pro-
      
Marchildon’s data are the most complete and most recent available for Canada. Unfor-
tunately, for most mergers, the Marchildon series does not include the jurisdiction of in-
corporation of the surviving firm, making it difficult to determine whether the resulting 
combination was incorporated under federal or provincial law. This problem led to the 
second step of my procedure, which was to search the Corporations Branch records of 
Library and Archives Canada for every combination in the Marchildon series. The ar-
chival records of the Corporations Branch (the predecessor of Corporations Canada) in-
clude organizational files for all companies incorporated, amalgamated, and/or dis-
solved under federal law between 1867 and 1973. In order to determine whether a par-
ticular combination was organized under federal law, I simply searched for it using the 
archive’s search engine. I deemed combinations whose organizational documents are 
included in the archive to be federal companies and combinations whose organizational 
documents are not included in the archive not to be federal companies. Note that this 
procedure only reveals whether a given company was organized under federal law—it 
provides no information as to which jurisdiction non-federal companies were organized. 
232  This is likely a conservative estimate, as false negatives (due to incorrect company 
names or missing files) seem far likelier than false positives (due to companies appear-
ing in the federal archives that were not in fact federal companies). 
233  See Curtis, supra note 162 at 7. Federal incorporation was popular enough in 1920 for 
Thomas Mulvey to write: “It may fairly be said that all the large corporations in Canada 
are incorporated under Dominion law. Undoubtedly some of them are carrying on busi-
ness under Provincial legislation, but the number is negligible” (Thomas Mulvey, “Some 
Phases of Canadian Company Law” (1920) 40:10 Can LT 832 at 848). 
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vincial companies to conduct national business remained uncertain.234 
This issue was not definitively resolved until the 1916 case of The Bonan-
za Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. The King and Another.235 In 
this case, the Privy Council held that provincial companies could conduct 
extra-provincial business so long as they received authorization from the 
hosting jurisdiction.236 In reality, provincial companies had already been 
engaging in extra-provincial business for years, but their constitutional 
authority in doing so was uncertain before 1916.237 
 Canadian promoters may have also seen federal law as a means of 
marketing their firms to foreign investors. In light of Canada’s marginal 
status within the British economic empire, many promoters emphasized 
the “national” scope of their merger projects to assure London-based in-
vestors of their credibility and financial soundness.238 Combinations often 
had names beginning with “Canada,” “Canadian,” or “Dominion,” high-
lighting their national reach.239 This spirit of aggrandizement may have 
extended to the incorporation process itself, with promoters choosing Do-
minion incorporation for its national cachet. Even in recent decades, the 
legitimacy that federal law is believed to communicate to investors has 
remained a factor in jurisdictional selection.240 In the early twentieth cen-
tury, this factor was likely even more important.241 
                                                  
234  The Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 172, s 92(11) granted the provinces exclusive au-
thority over “The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects.” It was uncertain 
whether companies with “provincial objects” could also do business outside their prov-
ince. 
235  [1916] UKPC 11.  
236  See ibid. Together with Parsons, supra note 173, this case provides the constitutional 
basis for Canadian corporate law federalism. 
237  The parliamentary debates on the Companies Act, 1902 indicate Ontario companies 
were already being formed specifically to do business in other provinces, despite the 
constitutional uncertainties (see Senate Debates, 22 April 1902, supra note 189 at 265 
(Hon Richard William Scott); House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1902, supra note 204 
at 5057−58 (Hon Clifford Sifton). Although Marchildon does not identify the jurisdiction 
of incorporation for the majority of the combinations in his series, he specifically identi-
fies a number of combinations, including large enterprises such as Canada Bread Co., 
Ltd., Canadian Canners Limited, and the Spanish River Pulp and Paper Co., Ltd., as 
Ontario companies (see Marchildon, Promotion, Finance and Mergers, supra note 132 
at 261–66).  
238  See Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 10–12. 
239  See ibid. 
240  See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Rationales Underlying Reincorporation”, supra note 7 at 
300. 
241  See Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 12. 
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 Finally, federal law was popular for the simple reason that it facilitat-
ed mergers.242 In this regard, it is important to consider the typical means 
by which Canadian combinations were formed. According to Curtis’ study, 
the most common method of forming combinations was through outright 
purchases of business assets, followed closely by purchases of stock.243 Out 
of 374 business consolidations between 1900 and 1933 (a period encom-
passing the first and second Canadian merger waves), a total of 189, or 
just over 50%, were structured as asset purchases, a total of 155, or ap-
proximately 41%, were structured as stock purchases, and a total of 21, or 
approximately 6%, were structured as a hybrid of asset and stock pur-
chases.244 Clearly, stock and asset purchases were the dominant means of 
forming combinations. 
 Consummating these purchases was a straightforward process under 
the federal joint stock companies act. Unlike the corporation acts of most 
American states (aside from New Jersey and its progeny), the Companies 
Act, 1902 included no antitrust, anti-combination, or anti-monopoly provi-
sions. Nor did it include limits on maximum capitalization, an important 
issue for promoters seeking to issue public securities.245 Aside from rail-
road, telephony, and financial services companies, which were governed 
by specific acts of Parliament, companies were not limited to specific lines 
of business and were free from the quo warranto proceedings faced by 
corporations in the United States. Finally, Canadian companies were ex-
pressly permitted to purchase the stock of other companies,246 a power 
that remained uncertain under many state corporation acts.247 Given the 
permissiveness of federal law, Canadian promoters had little reason to 
seek alternative jurisdictions. 
 Even if they had, the companies acts of the individual provinces were 
similarly liberal. The Ontario Companies Act, revised in 1897, was itself 
                                                  
242  Again, despite the ubiquitous use of the term “merger” in the academic literature, very 
few “mergers” in the early twentieth century were mergers (or amalgamations) in the 
legal sense. See Lamoreaux, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
243  See Curtis, supra note 162 at 7. 
244  See ibid. The structure of nine combinations is listed as “not known” (ibid). Curtis does 
not identify a single combination as being structured as a legal amalgamation. 
245  Prior to the Great Merger Movement, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania limited capital-
ization to one million dollars (see Annex A). Many Canadian mergers were capitalized 
in excess of $10 million (see Marchildon, Profits and Politics, supra note 21 at 146–47). 
246  Assuming they were so empowered by their letters patent or by-laws (see The Compa-
nies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 35). 
247  This uncertainty was part of what made New Jersey’s legal reforms so attractive. See 
Vincent P Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History (Cambridge, Mass: Har-
vard University Press, 1970) at 42–43; Chandler, supra note 43 at 319–20; Thorelli, su-
pra note 52 at 84. 
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an important inspiration for the Companies Act, 1902.248 In 1897, the leg-
islature of Ontario “very nearly assimilated their practice to the English 
practice”249 by allowing the creation of joint stock companies without prior 
public notice.250 Following earlier Canadian legislation, the Ontario act in-
cluded no antitrust provisions and few restrictions on business activities. 
Companies were allowed to purchase other companies’ shares if author-
ized by a by-law approved by two-thirds of the shareholders.251 As dis-
cussed above, these reforms were associated with a significant increase in 
Ontario incorporations, which encouraged the federal government to re-
form its own companies act.252 Other provinces, including British Colum-
bia and Nova Scotia, adhered even more closely to English law by main-
taining the English practice of incorporation by registration.253 By 1907, 
even Quebec had enacted companies legislation closely based on the Com-
panies Act, 1902.254 Thus, although the largest combinations tended to in-
corporate federally, the substantive content of provincial law was not sig-
nificantly different. 
 In sum, the legal environment in Canada during the country’s first 
merger wave differed from the American environment roughly a decade 
earlier. During the Great Merger Movement in the United States, both 
antitrust law and market forces reduced the viability of “loose” combina-
tions. At the same time, many states’ corporate laws also inhibited “tight” 
combinations. In this environment, New Jersey provided an avenue of es-
cape from the restrictive laws of its sister states. The success of New Jer-
sey (and later Delaware) in attracting corporations eventually led to most 
other states adopting similarly permissive legal regimes.255 
 In Canada, analogous provincial competition was relatively muted. By 
the time the Canadian merger movement arrived, promoters enjoyed sig-
nificant latitude in organizing combinations, mitigating the competitive 
                                                  
248  See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text. 
249  Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 170 (Hon Richard William Scott). 
250  See The Ontario Companies Act, RSO 1897, c 191, s 9. 
251  See ibid, s 82. This requirement was stricter than the analogous provision in the Com-
panies Act, 1902, which allowed share purchases if authorized by the by-laws or letters 
patent (see Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 35). 
252  See supra notes 213–217 and accompanying text. 
253  See Companies Act, 1897, RSBC 1897, c 44, s 9–18; Nova Scotia Companies’ Act, SNS 
1900, c 11, s 6–15. The Nova Scotia act was so similar to the English Companies Acts 
that it expressly cross-referenced English statutory provisions. 
254  See The Quebec Companies’ Act, 1907, SQ 1907, c 48. 
255  The complex historical influence of Delaware corporate law is described in Harwell 
Wells, “The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940” (2009) 11:3 U Pa J Bus L 
573 at 585–86, 590–91. 
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pressures witnessed in the United States. Since Canadian businesses 
could easily combine under existing federal company law, there was no 
opportunity for any single province to capture the incorporation market. 
Ultimately, the reason there was never a “Canadian New Jersey” is that 
there was never any need for one—federal law already provided nearly 
everything New Jersey offered. Had he cast his attentions northward, 
James B. Dill would have approved.256 
Conclusion 
 The industrial consolidation of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries had lasting consequences in both Canada and the 
United States. Following New Jersey’s early success in attracting corpora-
tions, the US entered a decades-long period of active jurisdictional compe-
tition. In the 1920s and 1930s, after Delaware had succeeded New Jersey, 
many states embarked on comprehensive reforms to modernize their cor-
poration statutes.257 These reforms were partly driven by the changing 
needs of modern business, but they were also an attempt by state politi-
cians to halt the “exodus” of corporations to Delaware.258 As the years 
passed, this competitive pressure toward legal convergence led to an “S-
curve” pattern in corporate reform, as an accelerating number of state 
governments adopted various features of Delaware law.259 This process 
was hastened by promulgation of the Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA), a model corporation statute published by the American Bar As-
sociation in 1950, which itself drew heavily on the Delaware-influenced Il-
linois Business Corporation Act of 1933.260 Although the MBCA differed 
from Delaware law in a number of important respects, it was far closer to 
the Delaware act than to the traditional state acts of the nineteenth cen-
tury.261 Today, the similarities among the different states largely out-
weigh their differences, and American corporate law—despite its diffusion 
among fifty states—has grown increasingly standardized around the lib-
eral Delaware model. 
                                                  
256  Significantly, during the Parliamentary debates on the Companies Act, 1902, Dill’s 
work was cited favourably by Senator James Lougheed (see Senate Debates, 17 April 
1902, supra note 187 at 238). 
257  See Wells, supra note 255 at 590. 
258  Ibid at 573–76. 
259  See Romano, “Law as a Product” supra note 4 at 233–42. 
260  See Jeffrey M Gorris, Lawrence A Hamermesh & Leo E Strine, Jr, “Delaware Corporate 
Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis” (2011) 74:1 Law & 
Contemp Probs 107 at 109. 
261  See ibid at 109–12. 
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 Canadian corporate law has seen even greater standardization, but 
unlike in the United States, the major driver of policy convergence has 
been federal legislation. While state corporate law rapidly evolved during 
the first half of the twentieth century, Canadian company law remained 
relatively static until the legislative reforms of the 1970s. These reforms 
began with the Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1970 and continued 
with the adoption of the CBCA in 1975.262 In the decades between the 
Companies Act, 1902 and the CBCA, the only major revision of federal 
corporate law was the Companies Act, 1934, which maintained the letters 
patent system of earlier legislation.263 According to the 1971 Dickerson 
Report—the federal expert committee report that led to the CBCA—
Canadian corporate law had been “sadly neglected” for much of the pre-
ceding century, having not experienced significant change within “the last 
hundred years.”264 Breaking from this tradition, the CBCA brought major 
reforms, most notably by replacing the letters patent system with an 
American-style incorporation process.265 The impact of the CBCA has ex-
tended beyond federal law. Moreover, in the years following the CBCA’s 
adoption, a majority of the provinces enacted substantially similar acts, 
resulting in considerable standardization of Canadian corporate law.266 
Although this standardization was possibly a result of competition,267 it 
appears more likely that provincial governments have pursued a strategy 
of uniformity.268 Lacking an institutional tradition of competition among 
the provinces, and with a number of legal and practical obstacles to an ac-
tive incorporation market, Canadian law has modernized through a col-
lective, consensual process.269 
                                                  
262  RSO 1970, c 25; see Stewart, supra note 212 at 465–69. Ontario initiated this reform 
process by appointing a company law reform committee in the 1960s, the recommenda-
tions of which led to the Business Corporations Act, 1970 (ibid). Following the subse-
quent adoption of the CBCA, most Canadian provinces, including Ontario, adopted very 
similar versions of the federal statute (ibid).  
263  SC 1934, c 33, s 5. 
264  Robert WV Dickerson, John L Howard & Leon Getz, Proposals for a New Business Cor-
porations Law for Canada, vol 1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 2. 
265  See CBCA, supra note 8, s 5–9; Robert WV Dickerson, John L Howard & Leon Getz, 
Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (Ottawa: Information Can-
ada, 1971) vol 1 at 6, 18–19, 26. 
266  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
267  See Daniels, supra note 10 at 150–51. 
268  See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7 at 179–80. 
269  See ibid at 179–80. This consensus can also be seen in Canadian securities regulation, 
which takes the form of collective instruments jointly issued by the provincial securities 
commissions. 
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 These differences in legal reform between the United States and Can-
ada have contributed to substantive differences in American and Canadi-
an corporate law. As a competitive supplier of a specialized legal product, 
Delaware has been sensitive to the preferences of corporate managers, as 
conveyed to the state legislature by the Delaware corporate bar. The 
drafting of the CBCA was a more deliberate, technocratic process, in-
formed by issues broader than the preferences of the business communi-
ty.270 These differences are reflected in key aspects of the CBCA today. For 
example, compared to Delaware, the CBCA provides greater protections 
to minority shareholders.271 Similarly, neither the CBCA nor any provin-
cial act includes express anti-takeover provisions of the type adopted by 
many states (including Delaware) in the 1980s.272 Finally—and somewhat 
incongruously, given its strong shareholder protections—Canadian law al-
lows for greater recognition of non-shareholder “stakeholder” interests. 
While fiduciary duties under Delaware law are generally owed to share-
holders,273 the CBCA specifies that directors’ duties are owed to the “cor-
poration,”274 a broader concept which has facilitated appeals to corpora-
tions’ social responsibilities. In Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise275 
and Re BCE Inc.,276 the Supreme Court of Canada responded to these ap-
peals by expressly allowing directors to consider a wide range of non-
shareholder constituencies, a principle which was recently codified in the 
CBCA itself.277 For better or worse, each of these features of Canadian law 
have been shaped by general policy concerns, rather than by their desira-
bility to business managers. The irony, of course, is that Canadian law’s 
greater independence from the preferences of the business community is a 
                                                  
270  This process is both described in, and evidenced by Dickerson, Howard, & Getz, supra 
note 264. 
271  These protections stem in large part from Canada’s broad oppression remedy. See 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: 1995–2001” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s LJ 79 at 81–82, 102; Brian Cheffins, “The 
Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience” (1988) 10:3 U Pa J 
Intl Bus L 305 at 338–39; Puri et al, supra note 6 at 797–98. The barriers to sharehold-
er involvement in management are also much lower under the CBCA than under Del-
aware law (see CBCA, supra note 8, s 143(1) and Delaware General Corporation Law, 
tit 8 c 1 § 211(d) (2017)). 
272  Although NI 62-104 imposes obstacles to hostile tender offers (see e.g. Multilateral In-
strument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, BCSC MI 62-104 (1 February 2008) 
ss 2.2, 2.4–2.5, 2.8. 2.23–2.27, 2.28, 2.29). 
273  See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
274  See CBCA, supra note 8, s 122. 
275  Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461. 
276  Re BCE Inc, 2008 SCC 69, [2002] 3 SCR 560. 
277  Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No 1, SC 2019, c 29, ss 141–44. 
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result of business’ satisfaction at the height of the Canadian merger 
movement. 
 In conclusion, American and Canadian corporate law have both been 
influenced by historical factors. American law changed dramatically as a 
result of the Great Merger Movement, while Canadian law evolved more 
slowly until the legislative reforms of the 1970s, but both embody a liberal 
approach to key issues of corporate governance. Despite the differences 
described in this article, American and Canadian corporate law are in 
many respects quite similar, partly due to the ongoing convergence of in-
ternational corporate law and partly due to the specific influence of Amer-
ican law on Canada, of which the CBCA is an important example. Even at 
the fundamental institutional level, the distinction between the “competi-
tive” and “uniform” models may be weakening. Given Delaware’s decades-
long dominance of the US incorporation market, it is increasingly doubtful 
whether other states compete for corporations at all.278 Moreover, consid-
ering Delaware’s pervasive influence on the corporate law of other states, 
it is difficult to characterize the American system as a continuing labora-
tory of innovation. 
 In Canada, conversely, provincial competition is increasing. In the 
years since Cumming and MacIntosh found an absence of provincial com-
petition,279 several provinces have enacted reforms intended to attract 
business organizations. Following the discovery in the 1990s that Nova 
Scotia unlimited liability companies (“ULCs”) could be used as a tax-
saving device by firms doing business in both the United States and Can-
ada, Alberta and British Columbia adopted their own ULC legislation to 
attract cross-border subsidiaries of American corporations.280 Indeed, Al-
berta’s and British Columbia’s entrance into the ULC market led to sig-
nificant price competition in ULC registration fees.281 Another sign of 
                                                  
278  See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 5. Although there is some evidence that Ne-
vada attempts to compete with Delaware, it has achieved only limited success (see 
Bruce H Kobayashi & Larry E Ribstein, “Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law” 
(2012) 35:4 Seattle UL Rev 1165 at 1168–69). 
279  See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7 at 67–68. 
280  Prince Edward Island has also recently adopted ULC legislation.  Business Corpora-
tions Act, RSPEI 1988, B-6.01, Part III. 
281  See Gail Lilley & Michael Wager, “Creating Entrepreneurships: Form of Entity; Man-
agement Provision Concerns; Dispute Resolution Provisions; Growth Provisions – Iden-
tification of Rights and Responsibilities of Participants in Entrepreneurship Including 
Allocation of Risks” (Paper delivered at the Proceedings of the Canada-United States 
Law Institute Conference on Comparative Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship in Cana-
da and the United States, 13, 14 April 2010) (2007) 33:1 Can-USLJ 47 at 64–67; Robert 
Flannigan, “Immunity Shopping” (2011) 37:1 Queen’s LJ 39 at 44, n 7. Note that 
changes to the Canada-US tax treaty in 2010 reduced the usefulness of these structures 
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competition is Quebec’s 2009 Business Corporations Act, which compre-
hensively restated Quebec corporate law.282 The new act includes several 
reforms designed to enhance Quebec’s reputation as a business-friendly 
jurisdiction and retain domestic corporations that would otherwise incor-
porate under the CBCA.283 Finally, in a clear (and apparently successful) 
attempt to appeal to international investors, British Columbia eliminated 
all residency requirements for corporate directors, making British Colum-
bia particularly attractive for business entities with foreign ownership.284 
Although the significance of these efforts remains a question for future re-
search, the current literature likely understates the full extent of provin-
cial competition. 
 Ultimately, this convergence between American and Canadian law is 
unsurprising. The geographic, economic, and cultural proximity of the two 
countries has ensured close parallels between their respective approaches 
to business law. With respect to corporations, these parallels are particu-
larly strong, though they have manifested historically in surprising and 
unexpected ways. While recent developments in Canadian corporate law 
have broadened its approach to social responsibility, particularly com-
pared to Delaware law’s more narrow conception of corporate interest, 
these developments are in fact a historical reversal of the traditional pri-
orities of Canadian law. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was Ca-
nadian law that was more attentive to the interests of the business com-
munity and American law that was more reflective of social and political 
concerns. Indeed, this political responsiveness was precisely the problem 
      
(see E Miller Williams & Jeffrey Shafer, “The Canada-United States Tax Regime” 
(2011) 36:1 Can-USLJ 209 at 227). 
282  RSQ 2018, c S-31.1.  
283  See Glenford Jameson, “Competing with Ourselves: Supply-side Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters in Canada” (2013) 50:4 Alta L Rev 843 at 858–60; Rousseau, supra note 
24 at 8–9. 
284  See Kareen A Zimmer, “Canada: Good Reasons to Incorporate in British Columbia” (12 
January 2010), online: Mondaq <www.mondaq.com> [perma.cc/ECK3-BRHC]; Doing 
Business in Canada: A Practical Guide (Cassels Brock, 2011) at 3.4; “Directors’ Resi-
dency Requirements for Companies / Corporations for Each Canadian Jurisdiction” 
online (pdf): Corporate Research and Analysis Centre <www.crac.com/Documents/ 
tableau_exig_rescan_admin_en.pdf>. Currently, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, Quebec, and all three Canadian territories also impose no residency re-
quirements on boards of directors. Indeed, the decision by British Columbia to elimi-
nate residency requirements was partly a response to competition from Yukon, which—
despite its small population, remote location, and limited infrastructure—had managed 
to attract a number of corporations, particularly in resource extraction industries. For 
discussion of Yukon’s past and present efforts to compete with British Columbia, see 
Paul Haavardsrud, “Go North, not West: Yukon Lures Businesses with New Company 
Rules”, CBC News (1 May 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/business/go-north- 
not-west-yukon-lures-businesses-with-new-company-rules-1.3057441>. 
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from the perspective of American business leaders—and the underlying 
cause of the “race to the bottom” experienced in the United States.285 As a 
result of this process, American corporate law abandoned its concern with 
limiting the power of corporations, thereby becoming increasingly similar 
to the existing Canadian system. 
    
 
                                                  
285  During the early twentieth century, American business leaders also lobbied intensely—
and unsuccessfully—for a pro-business federal corporation act. See generally 
Hutchison, “Progressive Era Conceptions”, supra note 85 at 1051–85. 
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Annex A: State Law Restrictions on Corporations 
 This Annex A summarizes key antitrust provisions and other re-
strictions on corporations enacted by the five most prosperous states as of 
1895 (immediately preceding the Great Merger Movement). The five 
wealthiest states as of 1895 were New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, 
and Massachusetts, as measured by “true valuation of real and personal 
property,” according to US, Statistical Abstract of the United States.286 
These states were selected under the assumptions that (1) measured 
wealth is a proxy for business activity and (2) prior to the rise of New Jer-
sey, most corporations were legally organized under the law of their state 
of origin. 
STATE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS 
(organized by specific statute) 
1. New York Stock Corporation Law287 
§ 7. Combinations prohibited: 
corporations were prohibited from 
combining “for the creation of a mo-
nopoly or the unlawful restraint of 
trade or for the prevention of compe-
tition in any necessary of life.”288 
§ 42. Consideration for issue of 
stock and bonds: corporations 
were prohibited from issuing stock 
for less than par value.289 
                                                  
286  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896) at 340–41. 
287  See Stock Corporation Law, as amended in Charles A Collin, The Revised Statutes of 
the State of New York: Together with All the Other General Statutes (except the Civil, 
Criminal, and other Penal Codes) (Albany, NY: Banks & Brothers, 1896) vol 2 at 1003 
[The Revised Statutes of the State of New York, vol 2]. 
288  Ibid at 1008. 
289  See ibid at 1019. Acquiring stock for less than par value was the preferred means by 
which inside promoters compensated themselves for organizing mergers: see Gabriel 
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-
1916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967) at 17–24. Stock issued for an aggregate par 
value in excess of the real value of the corporation’s tangible assets was referred to as 
“watered stock” (ibid). For an overview of the meaning of “watered stock”, see “Watering 
Stock” in Gary Giroux, ed, Business Scandals, Corruption, and Reform: An Encyclope-
dia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2003) vol 2 at 645–46). This phenomenon (re-
ferred to by Marchildon as promotional stock) is described in the Canadian context in 
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Business Corporations Law290 
§ 8. Consolidation of corpora-
tions: any two or more corporations 
organized under the laws of New 
York and conducting business “of 
the same or of a similar nature” 
could consolidate into a single cor-
poration. However, the capitaliza-
tion of any such consolidated corpo-
ration could not exceed the aggre-
gate value of “the property, fran-
chises, and rights” thereof.291 
An Act to Prevent Monopolies in  
Articles of General Necessity292 
§ 1. Combinations whereby competi-
tion would be “restrained or pre-
vented, for the purpose of advancing 
prices” were prohibited.293 
2. Pennsylvania Corporations294 
§ 65. Corporations were prohibited 
from issuing capital stock in an  
 
      
Gregory P Marchildon, Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the Gilded Age of Canadi-
an Finance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 30–31, 69–71, 145–51. 
290  See Business Corporations Law, as amended in The Revised Statutes of the State of New 
York, vol 2, supra note 2 at 1384. While the Stock Corporation Law applied to all corpo-
rations, the Business Corporations Law applied to the narrower subset of corporations 
organized for business purposes (ibid at 1384). 
291  Ibid at 1385. Again, the limitation on capitalization was intended to prevent the issu-
ance of watered stock: see Kolko, supra note 4 at 17–24. 
292  See An Act to Prevent Monopolies in Articles of General Necessity, as amended in 
Charles A Collin, The Revised Statutes of the State of New York: Together with All the 
Other General Statutes (except the Civil, Criminal, and other Penal Codes) (Albany, NY: 
Banks & Brothers, 1896) vol 3 at 2953. 
293  Ibid. 
294  See Corporations, as amended in Frank F Brightly, A Digest of the Statute Law of the 
State of Pennsylvania from the Year 1700 to 1894 (Philadelphia: Kay and Brother, 1894) 
vol 1 at 403. 
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amount greater than one million 
dollars.295 
§ 67. Shareholders were prohibited 
from purchasing capital stock with a 
note or other debt obligation. Corpo-
rations were prohibited from pur-
chasing or holding the stock of any 
other corporation.296 
Manufacturing Companies297 
§ 1. Manufacturing corporations 
were prohibited from issuing capital 
stock in an amount greater than $5 
million. This section also imposed 
various limitations on the issuance 
of preferred stock.298 
§ 13. All manufacturing, mining, 
and quarrying corporations were 
strictly limited to the purpose of 
their creation as specified in their 
charters.299 
                                                  
295  See ibid at 404. Limiting capitalization to one million dollars (approximately 
$30,100,000 in 2017 dollars) was a significant restriction on corporate size. To put this 
amount in perspective, the United States Steel Corporation, one of the largest combina-
tions of the era, was incorporated in New Jersey with a capitalization of nearly $1.4 bil-
lion (see John Moody, The Truth About the Trusts: A Description and Analysis of the 
American Trust Movement (New York: Moody Publishing Company, 1904) at 453). 
296  See Brightly, supra note 9 at 404. 
297  See Manufacturing Companies, as amended in Frank F Brightly, A Digest of the Statute 
Law of the State of Pennsylvania from the Year 1700 to 1894 (Philadelphia: Kay and 
Brother, 1894) vol 2 at 1291. The Manufacturing Companies act applied specifically to 
manufacturing corporations. 
298  See ibid. 
299  See ibid at 1293. 




3. Illinois An Act Concerning Corporations300 
§ 5. Powers—restrictions as to 
real estate: corporations were per-
mitted to hold real and personal es-
tate, but only to the extent neces-
sary for the transaction of their 
business.301 
Trusts and Conspiracies Against 
Trade302 
§ 1. Defines a trust: “any combina-
tion of persons, firms, corporations, 
or associations for the purpose of fix-
ing prices, restricting output, or oth-
erwise reducing competition” was 
defined as a “trust.”303 
§ 2. Forfeiture of franchise: any 
corporation violating the act (i.e., 
fixing prices, restricting output, or 
otherwise reducing competition) for-
feited its charter and franchise, 
thereby ceasing to exist.304 
§ 10. Purchaser liable: any cus-
tomer of any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or association violating the act 
was not liable to pay for the goods or 
services purchased.305 
                                                  
300  See An Act Concerning Corporations, as amended in Harvey B Hurd, The Revised Stat-
utes of the State of Illinois, 1893 (Chicago: Chicago Legal News Company) at 364. 
301  See ibid at 365. As discussed in Part II A, this section was interpreted by the Supreme 
Court of Illinois to limit the ability of corporations to purchase the shares of other cor-
porations (see People ex rel Peabody v Chicago Gas Trust Co, 130 Ill 268 (Ill Sup Ct 
1889)). 
302  Hurd, supra note 15 at 519. 
303  Ibid. 
304  See ibid. 
305  See ibid at 520. 




§ 1. Any corporation exercising 
“powers not conferred by law” was 
subject to a quo warranto proceed-
ing.307 
 
4. Ohio Corporations308 
§ 3863. Manufacturing and mining 
corporations were permitted to pur-
chase the stock of railroad and other 
transportation corporations, but on-
ly with the consent of two-thirds of 
the shareholders of the target corpo-
ration.309 
Quo Warranto310 
§ 6761. Any corporation that “mis-
used a franchise, privilege, or right 
conferred upon it by law” or that 
“exercised a franchise, privilege, or 
right in contravention of law” was 
potentially subject to a state civil ac-
tion.311 
5. Massachusetts Of Certain Powers, Liabilities, and 
Duties of Corporations312 
                                                  
306  See Quo Warranto, as amended by Hurd, supra note 15 at 1087. 
307  Ibid. 
308  See Corporations, as amended in Florian Giauque, The Revised Statutes of the State of 
Ohio (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896) vol 1 at 801. 
309  See ibid at 974. Although this provision is somewhat unclear, it seems to imply that 
stock purchases were generally prohibited. 
310  See Quo Warranto, as amended in Florian Giauque, The Revised Statutes of the State of 
Ohio (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896) vol 2 at 1662. 
311  Ibid at 1662–63. This section provided the basis for the Ohio Attorney General’s lawsuit 
to dissolve the Standard Oil Trust: see State ex rel Attorney General v Standard Oil Co, 
30 NE 279 (Ohio Sup Ct 1892) at 287–88. 
312  See Of Certain Powers, Liabilities, and Duties of Corporations, as amended in The Pub-
lic Statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Boston: Rand, Avery & Company, 
1882) at 564. 
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§ 17. Corporations were prohibited 
from issuing shares for less than par 
value.313 
Of Manufacturing and Other Corpo-
rations314 
§ 7. Manufacturing, mechanical, and 
mining corporations were prohibited 
from issuing capital stock in excess 
of one million dollars.315 
§ 37. When any manufacturing, me-
chanical, or mining corporation in-
creased its capital stock, all share-
holders were entitled to participate 
in proportion to their sharehold-
ings.316 
§ 42. Imposed various limitations on 
the issuance of preferred stock.317 
§§ 46–49. Corporations were prohib-
ited from issuing stock in exchange 
for debt or personal services.318 
 
                                                  
313  See ibid at 567. Again, acquiring stock for less than par value was the preferred means 
by which inside promoters compensated themselves for organizing mergers (see Kolko, 
supra note 4 at 17–24). 
314  See Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations, as amended in The Public Statutes of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 27 at 570 [Of Manufacturing and Oth-
er Corporations]. 
315  See ibid at 573. 
316  See ibid at 577–78. Since many combinations acquired individual corporations by issu-
ing shares in exchange for the target corporation’s stock or assets, this section made 
mergers more difficult (see Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
at 319–20, 323, 332, 387, 415). 
317  See Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations at 578. 
318  See ibid at 579. This rule discouraged large consolidative mergers by preventing the 
surviving corporation from issuing free or discounted shares to inside promoters. Pro-
moters were often issued shares as compensation for organizing a combination (see 
Kolko, supra note 4 at 17–24). 
